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THE NLRB AND JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES:
THE AFTERMATH OF CBS
JAMES B. ATLESON*

Against a background of the factors which engender work assignment disputes, Professor Atleson considers the difficulties encountered by the National Labor Relations Board in implementing the Supreme Court's mandate
to make affirmative determinations in these controversies. Analyzing the
myriad of problems involved in this segment of labor law, including those of
statutory interpretation, the author suggests that the present Board approach
may be hampering the efficient operation of settlement machinery provided
by the Taft-Hartley Act.
INTRODUCTION

Jurisdictional disputes are common in everyday life. Controversies
between vested interests and interlopers in protected territory, between
physicians and chiropracters, between lawyers and accountants or trust
companies, between governmental agencies or state and federal courts,
arise continually. Jurisdiction has been especially troublesome in labor
relations. 1 It has been said that "the principle of union jurisdiction lies
at the very foundation of trade union structure in this country and that
it is the feature which most clearly distinguishes the American labor
movement from its European counterparts."
The failure on the part of labor to establish a completely effective
machinery for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes' stems in part from
the concept of jurisdiction itself. Experience with the Knights of Labor
taught American unions that overlapping jurisdiction inevitably meant
rival unions; 4 and competition was deemed harmful to the labor movement. The Knights
admitted into their ranks individuals and locals which had been expelled from
national unions and which, on occasion, undermined the standards of employment
* Assistant Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law;
B.A., J.D., Ohio State University; L.LW.M, Stanford University School of Law.
1 Mann & Husband, Private and Governmental Plans for the Adjustment of Interunion
Disputes: Work Assignment Conflict to 1949, 13 STAN. L. Rv. 5 (1960) [hereinafter cited

as Mann].
2 Aaron, Union Procedures for Settling Jurisdictional Disputes, 5 LAB. LJ. 258, 259
(1954).
3 Mann 5-28.
4 ULMA-, TW RISE oF Tim NATIoNAL TRADE UmoN 367, 404-05 (1955)

as UL ANJ.

[hereinafter cited
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which the national unions were striving to secure. Indeed, . . . it was the struggle with the Knights which elevated the principle of exclusive jurisdiction to its
position of unchallenged eminence in the American trade union movement. 5

As a result, the AFL began as an agency of limited powers based upon
doctrines of autonomy and exclusive jurisdiction.' This latter principle
meant that each national was to possess the exclusive right to acquire
and retain members within the job territory authorized by its AFL
charter. This principle was evolved to minimize competition and conflict
among national unions and workers.
National unions drew their territorial boundaries along national lines.
Each national union was issued a charter defining its jurisdiction along
craft lines, but generally issuance of a charter merely involved the accept7
ance of the national's own definition of the scope of its job territory.
"[T]he combined factors of exclusive jurisdiction and organization by
craft both reflected and heightened job consciousness." 8
Only one union is to have title to particular work. "Only one national
union in the territory covered . . . can be a legitimate union. Any rival

local, sectional or national union is an outlaw (dual) union."O Every
local has a charter setting out its territory or trade boundary, and must
belong to the national representing that trade or be labeled an "outlaw"
union. °
Jurisdiction of a union is considered a property right, and the charter
its certificate of title." Given the importance of property rights in American life, it is easy to see why jurisdictional disputes generate the ardor
usually associated with religious conflicts.
Persistent attempts on the part of the AFL to resolve disputes between national unions proved fruitless.'" Ironically, the jealously guarded
5 Id. at 404-05. Furthermore, unions which were composed of workers who were not highly
skilled or whose trade was not substantially organized feared the numerically larger Knights.
o See Kahn, Recent Developments in Organized Labor, Naw D=NsboNs iN COLLEcTivE
BARGAINIG 3, 4 (1959).

7 ULmAN 406.
8 SLICHITER, HEALY & LIVERNASH, THE ImPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 246 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SLICHTER]; see Pendleton, Comment, SYmPosIrum
ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW 143 (Slovenko ed. 1961).

9 Barnett, The Causes of JurisdictionalDisputes in American Trade Unions, 9 HARv. Bus.
REv. 400, 401 (1931).

10 Whitney, Jurisdiction of the American Building Trades Unions 100 (32 Jons HorXKIs
Scm. No. 1, 1914).
11 Dunlop, JurisdictionalDisputes, N.Y.U. SEcoND ANNUAL CO FRENCE ON LABOR 477,

UNV. ST DiEs IN HIST. AnM POL.

482 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Dunlop].
12 Mann 8-28.
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principles of autonomy and exclusive jurisdiction which evolved to avoid
union competition caused continual jurisdictional warring among AFL
affiliates. The AFL was reluctant to apply force to member unions,
especially against unions which were unwilling to accept adverse arbitra-

tion awards and strong enough to contemplate withdrawal from the
federation.

Implicit in the very notion of jurisdiction is a lack of class conscious-

ness or working class solidarity. 3 The American labor movement, com-

posed of autonomous groups competing for employment opportunities,
has used the concept of jurisdiction as a substitute control mechanism
for class consciousness.' 4
Jurisdictional disputes generally arise from economic and political

factors, including the economic interests of the workers and the institutional interests of the union itself. The economic base of jurisdictional
disputes is the competition for the control of jobs. Perlman has described
the worker's feeling of living in a world of limited opportunity.' 5 This
((scarcity consciousness" may be the result of the worker's feeling of
personal limitations or may result from an institutional order which

rations opportunity. In particular, it is recognized that any contraction
of the area in which skills are to be employed curtails opportunity for
jobs.'" The union senses the limitation of work in a given trade, and

some of its work, the amount left for
feels that if another union usurps
7
its members is diminished.'

13 This characteristic has been discussed at length by Perlman who attributes this phenomenon partly to the heterogeneity of the work force, the lack of a common language,
culture or religion, and the existence of free land and the early ballot. PERLMAN, A THEORY
OF THiE LABOR MOVEMENT 162-69, 254-80 (1928). The phrase "class consciousness" refers to
an individual's perception of himself as a member of a particular soclo-economic group and
his perception of his opportunities for upward mobility. It does not refer to the actual
structure of the existing stratification system or to the actual mobility rates of the system.
14 STRAND,

JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES IN CONSTRUCTION:

THE CAUSES, THE JOINT BOARD,

NLRB 27-28 (1961) [hereinafter cited as STRAND]. jurisdictional disputes are not a
uniquely American phenomenon. The principle of exclusive jurisdiction is not recognized in
England, however. Kovarsky, The JurisdictionalDispute in England, 12 LAB. L.J. 217, 223
(1961). See also GALENSo, TRADE UuzoN DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE 64 (1962).
15 PEarMAN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 239-40.
16 Hyman & Jaffe, JurisdictionalDisputes, N.Y.U. FIRST AwNuA CoNFERENcE or LABOR
423, 450-51 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Hyman].
17 STRAND 29. Concerted effort to protect or enlarge the employment opportunities of
members or to prevent the undermining of the wage scale is not a unique characteristic of
the labor movement. Other economic agents seek a greater degree of security in an economy
in which economic well-being is subject to unpredictable changes. Farmers call upon government to prevent the undermining of parity prices while businessmen seek tariffs or other
AND THE
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Union members, having devoted substantial effort and time to acquiring
knowledge of a particular trade or skill, feel they have an investment
in, if not a right to, that trade.' Thus, unions representing these individual interests desire full control of the craft. The essence of a property
right is the right to exclude others; no other association can be permitted
to enter into the trade.' 9 Furthermore, the bargaining strength of a union
is in part measured by the degree to which the union is independent of
the employer.2 ° This independence depends upon the existence of a demand for its services by another employer. Thus, "economic versatility"
of a union's members is an important bargaining asset. Crafts normally
consist of tasks that can be split off and performed by workers unable
to perform other tasks involved in the craft. Such division weakens the
economic position of the union and its members. The emotionalism surrounding jurisdictional disputes is therefore partially a result of a feeling
on the part of union members that their jobs, wage standards or working
conditions are at stake.
The extensive detail and fine distinction of jurisdictional disputes have evoked
amazement and ridicule from the onlooker but they do not appear ludicrous or
hair splitting to men who depend on jurisdictional lines to guarantee them work
where very little or even none at all would otherwise be available and certainly
m21
not at such high rates of remuneration.
Jurisdictional disputes are critical, especially in periods of job scarcity,

to those whose jobs may depend on the outcome. 2
Since the economic losses to the individual worker from jurisdictional
import controls on foreign goods. HABER,

LABOR RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE BUILD156 (1956).
18 "The higher the skill required on a particular job, the greater is likely to be Job
consciousness and pride .... " ScuTER 250.
19 Aaron, Union Proceduresfor Settling JurisdictionalDisputes, 9 LAn. L.J. 259 (1954).
A union's rights become paramount, not only over a rival union, but also over the wishes
of the men actually performing the job. Although the AFL never fully exercised its jurisdiction in relation to unskilled workers, the federation vigorously opposed the intervention of
the CIO. To the AFL the territory belonged to its affiliates even though the workers were
not organized. The work itself, not the workers, was important.
Merger eased jurisdictional strife, and the older AFL concept of jurisdiction was modified.
The new standard, set out in article MI, § IV of the federation's constitution, uses the
concept of "established bargaining relationships." Jurisdiction exercised at the time of merger
was to be considered inviolate. Thus, the status quo was maintained. See SLIcnTER 248.
20 U~w"r
313-14.
21 Dawson, Hollywood's Labor Troubles, 1 IND. &LAB. REL. REv. 638 (1948).
22 Fisher, The Settlement of Work Jurisdictional Disputes by Governmental Agencies, 2
IN. & LAB. REL. REv. 335, 339 (1949).
DiG TRADES
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strikes often exceed his rewards from victory, economic self-interest
cannot be a complete explanation. It is important to note -thatunions also
pursue institutional objectives, such as survival or growth, in addition to
defending the economic self-interest of its members. A union seems basically to be a political institution operating in an economic environment. Its
desire to expand its territory, increase its membership and protect its exclusive jurisdiction may be based upon overtones of sovereignty2
Despite charters and constitutional expressions of jurisdiction, and
although there is little difficulty with the core of a union's jurisdiction,
the outer boundaries of a union are unclear. In addition, though no craft
can be completely substituted for another,24 often, on the fringe of a
craft's expertise,
the skills of one union can be substituted for the skills
25
of another.
It is impossible to describe work tasks in exhaustive detail. Furthermore, modifications in material, tools and techniques render existing
definitions of jurisdiction obsolete and inadequate. Even precise definition, however, would not solve the problem of an aggressive union's
attempts to promote the job-oriented interests of its members or to
strengthen itself.2 6
Turning to some of the specific causes of jurisdictional disputes, the
introduction of new materials, techniques or machinery often creates
problems 27 which cannot be resolved by the union's delineation of jurisdiction in the charter. 28 Furthermore, the formal organization of separate
crafts into unions2 9 accentuates inter-union friction. In industries such
as construction each union has a tradition of autonomy and freedom of
23

Barnett, The Causes of Jurisdictional Disputes in American Trade Unions, 9 HAuv.

Bus. RFv. 400, 401 (1931). There may also be a psychological base. This "prima donna"
factor may consist of vanity, pride or simply lust for power.
24 STRAD 34 n.18. One exception may be the laborers, which is largely composed of unskilled workers. The nature of the work and the relatively low pay scale of laborers may

deter rival union incursions into the laborers' job territory while encouraging employer
resistance to rival union demands.
25 STRAim 35.
26 The Carpenters Union considered that everything made of wood or which had ever
been made of wood was within its jurisdiction. CamsxsT, EmPRE n WOOD, A HISTORY OF
= CARPENTERS UmoN
27 STRAND 41-44.

171, 208 (1956).

28 Dunlop states that this factor has been overemphasized as much technical change
affects the "interior" of a union's jurisdiction only. An adverse affect on job opportunities
within a union may cause greater aggressive behavior at the frontier, however. Dunlop 488-89.
29 Dunlop 484.
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action. 0 Moreover, work is mainly casual so union ties are more significant than association with a particular employer .3 Disputes are often
caused by the existence of a large general worker's union such as the
hod carriers. 32 Laborers can often perform many of the more unskilled
tasks within the jurisdiction of a craft union. Similarly, the growth of
multicraft semi-industrial unions, such as the International Association
of Machinists or International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, has
stimulated jurisdictional disputes by creating conflicts with craft unions. 8
Although "the proprietary interest in the scope of job duties is likely4
to be expressed more forcibly when work opportunities are slackening,"8
unions will nevertheless guard against incursions in good times, and may
become more -aggressive when its membership is declining. Internal
political conditions may also be relevant.", In the building trades, where
business agents are ordinarily elected for short terms, jurisdiction may
become a political issue.
Associated with such campaigns, or to fulfill election promises, a business agent
of a craft may seek to change jurisdictional lines that have been taken for granted
in a locality. A new business agent may seek to take a tough position and extend
his jurisdiction. The result may well be retaliation by other crafts and difficulties
on existing projects. 6

Although jurisdiction is drawn on national lines, local variations may
blur those lines. Differences in the application of jurisdiction are partly
caused by differences in tradition and custom, employer preferences,
local leadership and strength, and the degree of the union's specialization.3 7 Furthermore, the vigor of a union's assertion of jurisdiction may
vary with the size of the job.
30 Id. at 485.
31 Hyman 424.
32 Dunlop 485.
33 Industrial unions are less susceptible to jurisdictional disputes among themselves. Disputes may arise within an industrial union, however, between the craft and industrial segments. See SLICeHTER 270-76.
Some feel that Taft-Hartley encourages preoccupation with work jurisdiction. By making
it possible for a craft to carve out bargaining units from an industrial unit, "the law may
have made the proprietary interest in work boundaries a more substantive issue in certain
cases." Id. at 256-57. An industrial union, faced with a possible internal revolt, may become
especially attentive to work boundaries. If the revolt is successful, the new craft unit may
sharpen interest in work jurisdiction.
34 Id. at 251.
35 Id. at 253; STRANo 39-41.
36 SLICHTER 253-54. Jurisdiction will be valuable as a political issue when other factors
have made it important to the union's members.
37 Dunlop 487-88.
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Employers may cause jurisdictional disputes by making assignments
contrary to traditional jurisdictional lines or by following a vacillating
work assignment policy. On the other hand, the employer may honestly
be in error. In any event, an employer's violation of the traditional lines
may seem reasonable to him because of wage rate differentials or because
of antagonism to a particular union or its leaders, or may be motivated
by union pressure or anti-union bias. Lower echelon supervisors may
seek to favor those working with them by giving workers jobs properly
within the jurisdiction of another union.
The structure of employer relationships may also lead to jurisdictional
disputes. In the construction industry, boundaries between various
specialty contractors are frequently vague. To some extent contractors
on a single project are in competition with one another, and a union
may be working exclusively for a particular contractor. Thus, competition
among subcontractors, specialty contractors and general contractors may
be converted into a jurisdictional dispute between unions.",
Although jurisdictional strikes have aroused public concern and antagonism, they have not been numerous. During the period 1935-1947
jurisdictional strikes never "involved more than 1.6 percent of all workers
on strike ...

and never resulted in a greater loss than 2.7 percent of the

total number of man-days lost by strike activity." 9 Jurisdictional strikes,
however, tend to be concentrated in particular areas or industries, and
although they begin as internal affairs, the disputes break out into the
open, adversely affecting employers and the public. The economic losses
to the workers and to the employer often seem indefensible.4 ° The failure
of organized labor successfully to avoid or settle these disputes prompted
41
the passage in 1947 of a federal statutory scheme of dispute settlement.
88 Id. at 486-87.
39

Fisher, The Settlement of Work Jurisdictional Disputes by Governmental Agencies, 2

IN. & LAB. REL. REv. 335, 337 (1949). In 1946, jurisdictional disputes "accounted for only

3.5 per cent of the total number of work stoppages and only .5 per cent of the man-days
of idleness." Hyman 423.
40 "In such strikes the public and the employer are innocent bystanders who are injured
by a collision between rival unions. This type of dispute hurts production, industry, and
the public-and labor itself. I consider jurisdictional strikes indefensible." Address by President Truman on the State of the Union, Jan. 6, 1947, in 93 CONG. REC. 136 (1947). jurisdic-

tional strikes are like secondary boycotts in some
over the shoulder of some third party, usually an
Settling Jurisdictional Disputes, 5 LAB. L.J. 258.
SmcHTER 245. Indeed, most employers consider the

ways. Unions "strike at their opponents
employer." Aaron, Union Procedures for
Employers are seldom neutral, however.
determination of work assignments to be

one of their basic rights.
41 For a 'summary of the legislative history of these sections see Mann 40-48.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
STEPS TO INVOKE SECTION

[Vol. 53: p. 93

10(k)

Concerted action in support of a work assignment dispute was made an

unfair labor practice in 1947.42 The filing of a charge, however, does not
lead to the usual invocation of the Board's authority under section 10(c) 4
because Congress interposed a special procedure to be followed when
such charges are filed. Thus section 10(k)44 requires the NLRB to "hear
and determine" an unfair labor practice covered by section 8(b) (4) (D)
"whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice" within that section.
In order for the Board to proceed with the determination under Section 10(k),
the record ...

must show that a work assignment dispute . . . exists; that

there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent union has resorted to
conduct which is prohibited by Section 8(b)(4) in furtherance of the dispute;
and that the parties have not adjusted their dispute or agreed upon methods for
its voluntary adjustment. 45

After an employer files a charge, the Board makes three preliminary
determinations. First it must discern whether there is "reasonable cause"
to believe that the respondent union has engaged in prohibited activity."
Although section 10(k) when read literally requires only a "charge" of
proscribed activity, it seems logical to require the employer to present a
prima facie case. 7
The Board has held that evidence must relate to "conduct or speech"
of the union's representatives. In Local 106, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs (E. C. Ernst, Inc.)4" the Board found no evidence of a demand
by the operating engineers upon Ernst that he assign certain work away
from IBEW electricians. It was not sufficient that two competing groups
claimed the same work or even that there had been a concerted work
stoppage. All parties, however, had assumed that there was a dispute, and
the dispute had been determined by the Joint Board 0 in favor of the
engineers. In light of the facts of this case the Board's standard seems too
high. Although the "reasonable cause" standard is used by district
courts when a request is made for a 10(1)50 injunction, the absence of
42

Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Harfley Act) § 8(b) (4) (D), 61 Stat. 142

(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (D) (Supp. V, 1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRA].

43
44
45
46

LMRA § 10(c), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958).
LMRA § 10(k), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1958).
27 NLRB ANN. R-P. 176 (1962).
General Teamsters, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (1963) (B.P. John Furniture Corp.).

47 Ibid.
48 137 N.L.R.B. 1746 (1962).
49 See note 198 infra.
50 LMRA § 10(l), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (Supp. V, 1964).
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such a standard in the language of section 8(b) (4) (D) or section 10(k),
along with the arguable need for a higher standard in injunctions, raises
doubts about the Board's approach. Apparently, the Board will require
more than work stoppages, and illegal actions will have to be clear. 1
Furthermore, veiled threats are also insufficient, and language is said
to be "too vague and insubstantial" if it is "subject to interpretations
other than as a threat to engage in illegal conduct."52 In a section 10(l)
injunction proceeding brought by the General Counsel, the court must
also find reasonable cause to believe that the union engaged in prohibited
activity. For example, in Penello v. IBEW53 the court found "reasonable
cause)) even though the alleged threat was ambiguous and the union
representative denied a threat was even made. Although resolving conflicts of evidence would infringe the Board's authority, there seems to
be no reason for the court's standard in an injunction proceeding to be
lower than the Board's standard in a preliminary determination.
While an unambiguous threat standing alone would seem to imply a
work stoppage, the Board in Ernst held that such an isolated threat was
not sufficient. The Board's position seems to permit unions to apply considerable pressure and yet remain immune from Board scrutiny. Such
Board restraint will not encourage resort to private settlement machinery
-one of the statutory goals-especially when certain unions, such as the
IBEW, refuse to be bound by Joint Board determinations in certain
areas.54 On the other hand, unions seeking Board review will be encouraged to make certain that their conduct violates the act. Such a
dubious policy was questioned by President Truman in his veto message:
"The bill would force unions to strike or to boycott if they wish to have
a jurisdictional dispute settled by the National Labor Relations Board."55
Although the veto was overridden,55 the Board nevertheless should not re51 The "reasonable cause" standard has been extended into a full hearing on the merits of
whether an 8(b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice has been committed. See International Ass'n
of Machinists, 136 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1962) (Carling Brewing Co.).
52 General Teamsters, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (1963) (B. P. John Furniture Corp.).
53 195 F. Supp. 458 (D.D.C. 1963).
54 Local 12, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1963)
(Geo. E.
Miller Elec. Co.).
55 93 CONG. REc. 7486 (1947), 1 LEGISLAVE HISTORY OF TB'M LABOR I ANAGEMNT RELATIONS ACT 916 (1948) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

56 The Taft-Hartley Act was passed over the President's veto by a vote of 68 to 25 in
the Senate and 331 to 83 in the House. 93 CoNo. REc. 7692. (1947), 2 LEGIsLATVE HISToRY
1656 (passage by the Senate); 93 CONG. REC. 7504 (1947), 1 LEGISLATMV HISTORY 922-23
(passage by the House).
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quire a union to do more than "threaten, coerce, or restrain," as provided
in section 8(b) (4) (D); 11 indeed more recent Board decisions seem to
8
indicate a less severe approach
It should be noted that the act is not sympathetic to the equities of a
union's case. A union cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Board, and
furthermore must commit an unfair labor practice to satisfy one of the
conditions of the statutory settlement machinery. An employer, however,
may refrain from filing a charge, thus leaving the union no recourse. Such
a course of action may be followed by an employer faced with a weak
or nonstrategically situated union and willing to ignore that weaker
union's strike.5 9
Second, the Board's "reasonable cause" standard has been extended to
require an additional determination that a work assignment dispute within
the scope of section 8(b) (4) (D) exists. Thus, the union must not only
resort to prohibited activity to invoke the Board's authority, but it must
be correct in its assumption that a work assignment dispute exists. Although this requirement would not seem to present an insuperable barrier
to review, the Board has defined "work assignment dispute" narrowly.
Beginning with Local 107, Highway Truckdrivers (Safeway Stores,
Inc.) 0 the Board has held that a work dispute under section 8(b) (4) (D)
must involve a situation in which two or more employee groups are
actively seeking certain work. When no jurisdictional dispute is found
to exist, the Board will quash the notice of hearing under section 10(k).
In Safeway, the employer unilaterally transferred work away from
three teamsters who constituted the entire bargaining unit of Local 107,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and arranged for members of
a different IBT local, operating out of other plants of the employer, to
do the work. The termination of the one trucking operation covered by
Local 107's contract resulted in the teamsters' discharge. The local's
picketing was held not to be a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D) although
its conduct admittedly fell within the literal terms of that section. 01
The Board in Safeway interpreted NLRB v. Radio & Television
57 LMRA § 8(b) (4) (D), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (D)
(Supp. V, 1964).
58 See, e.g., Electrical Workers, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 159 (1964) (McCloskey & Co.); Local
1, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1964) (McDonnell Aircraft Corp.);
Detroit Mailers Union, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1964) (Detroit Gravure Corp.).
59 Hyman 454.
60 134 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1961).
61 Ibid.
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Broadcast Eng'rs (CBS) 62 to require "two or more employee groups
claiming the right to perform certain work tasks." The dispute in Safeway, the Board argued, was basically a dispute between Local 107 and
the employer, and concerned only one union's attempt to retrieve jobs.
The Board required that real competition between two unions be shown.
Other IBT locals had not pressed the employer for the work. Indeed, the
employer had caused the dispute. Section 10(k), reasoned the Board,
should not arbitrate disputes between one union and an employer
where no competing claims are involved. Whenever the employer "reallocates work among his employees or supplants one group of employees
with another, there is not a jurisdictional dispute. 0 3 Thus, while requiring
two competing unions, the Board's narrow holding is that "reallocation"
and allocation of work cannot be similarly treated under sections
8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) even though both situations seem to fall within
the statutory language.
The dissenters, Members Rodgers and Leedom, argued that nothing
in CBS suggested that the 8(b) (4) (D) language should not be read
literally. Indeed, the Court in CBS stated that the sections extend to a
dispute between a union and an unorganized group of employees as well
as between two unions, 64 and pre-CBS Board decisions support this
view."s Furthermore, the dissenters reasoned, the addition of the words
"trade, craft, or class" has broadened the coverage of section 8(b) (4) (D)
to include disputes involving nonunion groups. 66 However, it is doubtful
that unorganized employees would actively contest the picketing union's
claim. When work is assigned to nonunion employees, therefore, the
dispute is actually between the employer and the challenging union.
There is evidence that the section was passed to protect employers
from being caught in the middle of two rival employee groups." Although section 8(b) (4) (D) was primarily intended to cover a situation
where two employee groups claimed certain work, neither the legislative
02

364 U.S. 573 (1961).
107, Highway Truckdrivers, 134 N.L.R.B.

03 Local

1320, 1322 (1961) (Safeway Stores,
Inc.).
64 364 U.S. at 584.
65 Cf. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 126 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1960) (Tip Top
Roofers); Local 450, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 115 N.L.R.B. 964 (1956) (W. J.
Hedrick & H. W. Marshall, Jr.). But see Local 328, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union, 139
N.L.R.B. 598 (1962) (Acoustics & Specialties, Inc.).
06 See NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 364 U.S. 573, 584 (1961) ; Vincent v.
Steamfitters Local 395, 288 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1961).
07 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947), 1 LEGISLATIW HISTORY 314-15.
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history nor the statutory language expressly limits its coverage to disputes in which a union attempts to force a work assignment away from
an employee group which is also actively claiming the work. 8 The
Supreme Court has indicated that a strike in protest of a work assignment violates section 8(b) (4) (D) regardless of how passive the other
group of employees may be.69
It would seem reasonable to permit an employer to test a union's
jurisdictional claim even though those to whom the work was assigned
do not actively claim the work.70 It is difficult to tell whether a group
of employees will strike to secure or retain work until the work has actually been denied them, and a union could strike although it disclaimed
interest in the work while its members were performing it. The danger
of work stoppages and harm to the employer is the same whether the
group to which the work was assigned claims it or not. Indeed, the employees can now successfully bar a 10(k) determination by disclaiming
interest in the work. The employer is in a dilemma because that group
might strike if he submits to the striking union. Moreover, the Board
has converted the Supreme Court's accurate description of the dispute
in CBS into a definition of a jurisdictional dispute. Although the Court
did say that jurisdictional disputes are between "two or more groups
of employees,' 71 the Court was not called upon to determine what disputes
come under section 8(b) (4) (D) 7 2
Interestingly, a respondent union, according to the Board's decision
in UMW (Turman Constr. Co.)," cannot avoid a 10(k) determination
by a disclaimer of interest in presently representing the employees in
question. The Board stated that a 10(k) determination was necessary
in such a situation because there was no assurance that further work
interruptions would not occur. Surely this fear also exists when the
union to which the work is assigned disclaims any jurisdictional rights
to it.
Nevertheless, Safeway has been followed in subsequent cases. 74 In Local
68 Farmer & Powers, The Role of the National Labor Relations Board in Resolving
JurisdictionalDisputes, 46 VA. L. Rxv. 660, 667 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Farmer].
69 International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952).
70 Farmer 667.
71 364 U.S. at 579.
72 See Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1150, 1157 (1960).
73 136 N.L.R.B. 1068,(1962).
74 See, e.g., Local 678, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 145 N.L.R.B. No. 100 (1964) (W. R.
Aldrich & Co.); Local 1905, Carpet Layers, 143 N.L.R.B. 251 (1963)

(Southwestern Floor

Co.); Local 328, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union, 139 N.L.R.B. 598 (1962) (Acoustics &

Specialties, Inc.).
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272, Sheet Metal Workers (Valley Sheet Metal Co.) 75 the alleged dispute
was between two unions affiliated with the same international. The
international's constitution limited to two the number of employees belonging to an outside union who could work within the territory of another local. A local with jurisdiction forced the employer who had
transferred three members of an outside union into its territory to replace
one of the employees with one of its own members. Stressing that the
outside local did not claim the work, the Board quashed a notice of a
10(k) hearing.7 6 It is not clear why the Board did not dispose of the
case by holding that no "dispute" existed because both sister locals
apparently agreed with the territorial limitation.
Member Leedom, the only dissenter, argued that it was immaterial
that one union was not claiming the work so long as that group was
performing it. As he correctly pointed out, there are factual differences
between Safeway and Valley Sheet. In Safeway the employer precipitated
the dispute by transferring work away from one local, and that local
attempted to preserve its historical bargaining status. Member Leedom
argued that the question of whether a jurisdictional dispute exists is
can agree,
now in the hands of the employee groups involved and, if they
77
they can "divide up an employer's operations as they wish."
The Board's narrow reading of section 8(b) (4) (D) will not be limited
to the facts of Safeway, however. In a later case,78 the employer assigned
work to carpenters rather than lathers because the latter had requested
travel pay. Picketing by the lathers was held not to be a violation of
section 8(b) (4) (D), because the carpenters did not claim that the work
was within their jurisdiction and did not request that such work be
assigned to them. A similar result was reached in Local 1905, Carpet
Layers (Southwestern Floor Co.),79 where the disputed work had been
assigned to the carpenters despite contrary Joint Board decisions and
a 1961 agreement between the painters8° and the carpenters in which
the latter disclaimed jurisdiction over the disputed work. The painters,
as well as the carpenters, argued that no jurisdictional dispute existed.
Thus, the carpenters performed work in violation of precedent and both
75 136 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962).
76 See also Local 1102, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 140 N.L.R.B. 79 (1962) (Port Huron
Sulphite & Paper Co.).
77 136 N.L.R.B. at 1406.
(Acoustics
78 Local 328, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union, 139 N.L.R.B. 598 (1962)
& Specialties, Inc.).

143 N.L.R.B. 251 (1963).
80 Respondent, as predecessor of Local 1095, Carpet Layers.
79
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unions, possibly fearing an adverse result, were able to avoid a Board
determination.
The Safeway rule will also be applied when the employer's change of
operation causes the discharge of employees of a different employer. In
Local 331, Teamsters Union (Bulletin Co.)"' a newspaper publishing
company's decision to cease contracting out its home delivery distribution work resulted in the discharge of an employee of its contract-distributor. This employee's representatives then picketed the replacement.
The Board held that the union's sole object in such activity was to regain
lost employment, as in Safeway. The work was assigned to one of the
company's own drivers whose employee group wisely did not claim the
work.
It is interesting that the Board preferred to base its decision on preCBS cases,"' determining that no jurisdictional dispute existed where a
union struck to defend its past jurisdiction, rather than on Safeway,
thereby limiting the latter decision to cases involving a lack of competing
claims. In Local 292, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Franklin Broadcasting
Co.) 3 a strike to secure renewed contractual recognition of work jurisdiction was held not to be a jurisdictional strike. 4 In Franklin,however,
the Board held that the dispute did not concern work assignments but
involved the discharge of several union members and the employer's
refusal to sign a new union contract, despite the fact that the employer's
action resulted from his assignment of work formerly done by the union
members to another group of employees. The dissenters in Bulletin,
Members Rodgers and Leedom, while repeating their dissenting views
in Safeway, also challenged the applicability of Franklin. The striking
union in Bulletin represented none of the employer's employees and
was not concerned with the abolition of any jobs or the discharge of
Bulletin's employees. These distinctions were recognized by the majority,
but the policy of Franklin was held to extend to the indirect loss of employment.
As the dissenters in Bulletin point out, however, the Board has decided
on the merits cases very similar to Bulletin. In Longshoremen's Ass'n
81 139 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1962).
82 National Ass'n of Broadcast Employees, 127 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1960) (Gordon Broadcasting Co.); Local 292, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 126 N.L.R.B. 1212 (1960) (Franklin
Broadcasting Co.).
83 126 N.L.R.B. 1212 (1960).
84 Cf. Local 110, Sheet Metal Workers Ass'n, 143 N.L.R.B. 974 (1963) (Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.).
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(Union Carbide Chem. Co.)" 5 for instance, the International Longshoremen's Association protested a loss of work resulting from the employer's
decision to change its mode of operation and to have loading work performed by its own employees. The dispute was determined on the merits
even though the object of ILA's conduct could be said to be the retrieval
of work previously done by its members. Member Fanning, in a footnote
to the majority's opinion in Bulletin,8 6 thought it crucial that the ILA
sought to have its members perform the work under the changed method
operation, while the union in Bulletin sought to compel the employer to
return to his old mode of operation. In either case, however, the object
of the strike was to regain the same or similar work once performed by
the striking union. Furthermore, work had been lost in both cases by an
employee of an independent contractor because of a changed method of
operation, and the striking union sought to return to the old mode of
operation, i.e., to do the work it previously performed. It is difficult to
disagree with the dissent's contention that such factual differences are
87
immaterial.
Moreover, the Board has apparently extended the coverage of the act.
In Longshoremen's Union (Northern Metal Co.) 88 the ILA objected to
the employer's use of a fifteen-man gang of its members, instead of one
composed of twenty-two men, for the work of loading vehicles onto
vessels. Prior to 1960 the employer had used fifteen-man gangs for
loading of federal cargo under a contract with the United States. When
the employer received a contract to load privately-owned vehicles, ILA
claimed that it was the practice in Philadelphia to use a twenty-two-man
gang. Under an arbitration clause in the ILA-employer association contract, the twenty-two-man crew was found to be -the practice in the area,
although the grievance committee could not settle the jurisdictional dispute. The employer took twenty-two men under protest, arguing that
the additional seven men performed no work, and that if it had to
assign work to these extra seven men, it would have to' be work now
performed by yardmen, represented by the Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers Union. The ILA said its demand was not an attempt to displace
the yardmen.
With little difficulty, the Board found reasonable cause to believe
that the ILA had violated section 8(b) (4) (D), and held that the union
85 137 N.L.R.B. 750 (1962).
80 139 N.L.R.B. at 1396 n.2 (1962).
87 For a striking example of the result of the Board's approach see Administrative Ruling
of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Case No. SR-2177 (1962), 52 L.R.R.M. 1020 (1963).
88 137 N.L.R.B. 1451 (1962).
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had presented the employer with the alternative of either hiring seven
extra men who could not be used or displacing yardmen and giving
their work to the ILA. The Board found it significant that the yardmen
had "actively" intervened on the employer's side, apparently only trying
to defend area practice. The employer would not necessarily have to discharge the yardmen, and any wasted manpower would have been attributable to the operation of ,the work rule and does not seem relevant to
a determination that a jurisdictional dispute exists.
Admittedly, the determination of reasonable cause involves close factual issues. All jurisdictional strikes and threats are not covered by
section 8(b) (4) (D), but only those where an object is to force an assignment of work to one group of employees rather than to another.
However, where one object is to force a work assignment, it matters not
that the union has a dual purpose. Thus jurisdictional disputes have been
held to be properly before the Board despite such additional union aims
as the pursuit of better safety practices, 9 adherence to union wage
scales9" or to local standards of competency. 91 In International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers (Bendix Corp.) 2 the IBEW claimed there was no jurisdictional dispute because the object of its picketing was to increase wage
rates at the employer's construction site, not to compel a reassignment
of work. The IBEW argued that Bendix was not complying with wage
scales set by the Davis-Bacon Act. 93 Most of its appeals to the public
dealt with the wage-scale dispute. Indeed, the IBEW went so far as to
stipulate with Bendix that any positive award made by the Board should
be in favor of the engineers and technicians now performing the work.
Nevertheless, the Board found that there was reasonable cause to find
that an object "equal in importance" was to force assignment of work
away from the Bendix employees and to union members and local electricians. IBEW was apparently concerned that lower wages to out-oftowners would undercut local wage scales and had suggested that the
work be subcontracted to local electricians. Whether the employer would
have hired IBEW men instead of Bendix's employees to do the work
89 International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 108 N.L.R.B. 313 (1954) (Cargill, Inc.).
90 Local 365, Bhd. of Painters, 126 N.L.R.B. 683 (1960) (Southern Fla. Hotel Ass'n).
91 Local 508, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 124 N.L.R.B. 323 (1959) (Peacock Constr. Co.).
92 138 N.L.R.B. 689 (1962).
93 49 Stat. 1011 (1935), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (Supp. V, 1964). This section
provides for payment of prevailing wage rates to laborers and mechanics employed under U.S.
government contracts exceeding $2,000, for construction, alteration or repair of public property.
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under Davis-Bacon Act standards, however, would be a matter of
speculation. 4
More recently, in Local 3, Metal Polishers Union (Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co.),15 the Board held that a case was properly before it even
though the dispute concerned which of two existing bargaining units
appropriately included employees who performed the disputed work. Although an election in the appropriate unit would have resolved the
issue, the Board was precluded from holding one due to the absence of
an election petition therefor and the unwillingness of parties to agree to
such a procedure. Both the Metal Polishers Union and the Aircraft Employees Association had been certified and had worked in the same department doing almost the same work under the same supervision. The
work in dispute covered a job classification called "snaggers," now included in the Aircraft Employees Association's contract. The employer,
however, felt the work now belonged in the Metal Polishers' unit. The
work dispute arose when a number of employees in both groups were laid
off due to lack of work and the metal polishers threatened to strike
unless they received all of the work of the department. The Board held
that only one unit, consisting of the job classifications within the metal
polishers unit and the snaggers, was appropriate and that an election
would resolve the dispute. The Board also stated that it would entertain
a petition for the above appropriate unit whenever one was filed.96 The
Board, determining that the snaggers were in reality metal polishers, assigned the work to the metal polisher bargaining unit. Its approach in
Cleveland was similar to its approach in pre-CBS cases9 7 in which it refused to resolve disputes in proceedings to clarify certified units. The
Board had decided that jurisdictional strikes, in support of contract rights,
do not fall within the 8(b) (4) (D) prohibition, despite the fact that the
section's language does not make this exception. In these cases the Board
viewed the dispute as primarily a question of which of two certified bargaining units more appropriately included the work. The Board seems to
have reversed that position in this case, finding a probable violation of
8(b) (4) (D) in order to settle the matter. The Board's analysis of the
94 International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 138 N.L.R.B. 689, 697 (1962) (Bendix Corp.)
(dissenting opinion).
95 142 N.L.R.B. 374 (1963).
9 For a discussion of the Board's treatment of rights based on certification, see Farmer
700-06.
97 See, e.g., Local 173, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union, 121 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1958)
(Newark & Essex Plastering Co.).
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dispute in this case, however, employs the pre-CBS "unit determination"
approach rather than post-CBS criteria.

The third preliminary step to a 10(k) determination involves the
existence of private settlement machinery. The Board is directed to hear
and determine the dispute "unless, within ten days after notice that
such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the
Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted or agreed upon
methods for the voluntary adjustment of the dispute." 98

The Board, having defined "parties to the dispute" to include the employer as well as the two employee groups, 9 will not quash notice of a
10(k) hearing when agreement to private arbitration procedures is
alleged if one party has not stipulated to such procedures. 10 Furthermore, the Board has held that subcontractors and general contractors
must also agree to the settlement or the method of settlement. 10 Thus,
it is not sufficient that both employee groups are bound by an agreement, or that each employee group has an arbitration clause in its collective bargaining contract with the employer. Arbitration would not
bind one of the employee groups, and arbitration awards could be conflicting."0 2 Similarly, an agreement between the employer and the striking
03
union concerning work assignments is not sufficient.1
It is doubtful that the Board's strict policy follows from the purpose
of section 10(k), namely, the settlement of jurisdictional disputes.0 4
The section was intended to encourage private settlements and, if the employer is truly but a helpless victim, it is unclear why he should be concerned which agency settles the dispute. Indeed, the "settlement" exception to section 10(k) seems to have been designed to stimulate unions to
resolve their own disputes. In Senator Murray's words: "We are confident
98 LMRA § 10(k), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1958).
99 See, e.g., Carpenters Council, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (1964) (Stephen Gorman Bricklaying Co.); International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962) (Frank
P. Badolato & Son).
100 Local 9, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union, 113 N.L.R.B. 947 (1955) (A. W. Lee,
Inc.). Affiliates of the Building Trades Department, AFL, are bound by Joint Board
determinations through the Department's constitution. Thus, locals of national unions which
are members of the Department are bound despite their failure to agree to Joint Board
procedures.
101 United Bhd. of Carpenters, 139 N.L.R.B. 591 (1962) (0. R. Karst).
102 Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 141 N.L.R.B. 578 (1963) (News Syndicate Co.);
New York Mailers' Union, 137 N.L.R.B. 665 (1962) (New York Times Co.).
.03 Retail Clerks Ass'n, 125 N.L.R.B. 984 (1959) (Food Employers Council).
104

See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947), 1 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY 314.

1964]

JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES

that the mere threat of governmental action will have a beneficial effect
in stimulating labor organizationsto set up appropriate machinery for the
settlement of such controversies within their own ranks, where they
properly should be settled."'0 5 Neither a literal reading of section 10(k)
nor an examination of the legislative history of the act appears to require the employer's participation in private settlement proceedings." 6
On the other hand, it is arguable that private settlement machinery is
more effective when employers do participate in the proceedings. Defining "parties" to include only the competing employee groups would,
after all, force an employer to seek intervention or be bound by a determination to which he was not a party. Assuming that intervention
were granted, however, private settlement devices would arguably be
strengthened. 10 7 Furthermore, it is consistent with legislative policy to
permit the employer to test the respondent union's claim before the
Board when he has not agreed to be bound by private arbitration.'
Since the employer initiates the Board's activities, it seems reasonable
to consider the employer a party; the fact that he may be neutral with
respect to the result of the settlement does not detract from the fact that
his actions precipitated the dispute and that he is directly affected
by it.
One practical advantage of the Board's approach is that the employer
could introduce relevant evidence such as past practice, efficiency and
economy-factors peculiarly within his knowledge-at the private proceeding. Moreover, he may be deterred from ignoring the award by virtue
of his participation. It should be noted though, that before the Joint
Board the employer's assignment is not as significant a factor as it is
before the NLRB, assignments often being made by the former on the
basis of property rights between two or more unions. 10 9 Finally, since
no procedures exist under section 10(k) to bind the employer," 0 the
105 93 CoNG. RFc. 4155 (1947), 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1046 (Emphasis added.); see 93.
CoNGo. RaE. 6610 (1947), 2 LEGSiLAT E HRSTORY 1554-55 (remarks of Senator Morse);
NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 364 U.S. 573, 577: "Section 10(k) offers
strong inducement to quarrelling unions to settle their differences by directing dismissal of
unfair labor practice charges upon voluntary adjustment of the jurisdictional dispute."
(Emphasis added.)
100 See O'Donoghue, JurisdictionalDisputes in the Construction Industry Since CBS, 52
GEo. L.J. 314, 332 (1964) [hereinafter cited as O'Donoghue].
107 Id. at 334.
108 See Farmer 673.
109 See Dunlop 482; STRAND 61.
110 Mann 5; McGuinn, Jurisdictional Disputes and the NLRB, N.Y.U. F FENT
ANxuAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 103, 122 (1962) [hereinafter cited as McGuinn].
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private arbitrator's ability to enforce the settlement is perhaps the main
reason1 for the Board's strict policy of requiring the employer's pres11
ence.
If a party refuses to comply with a settlement which it had previously
agreed to accept, the Board will not make its own determination under
10(k) ;11 nor will the Board act under 10(k) when a party has announced
it will not honor a future decision made under an agreed upon method,
or that it has rejected a decision after it has been made.113 However, in
one case n 4 repeated statements by the IBEW that it would not be bound
by Joint Board determinations involving line work were considered relevant by the Board in rejecting a Joint Board determination and proceeding under section 10(k). Apparently, the employer's association was
not bound by Joint Board procedures and did not participate in the
proceeding. In a later decision,"' however, the Board based a similar
determination solely upon the continued refusal of the IBEW and the
employer association to be bound by certain Joint Board decisions. This
decision seems inconsistent with the policy of encouraging private settlements. 6 Although the Board's approach may be the only practical
way to settle these disputes, it leaves no incentive for the union and
employer association involved to submit to the Joint Board. The Board
has permitted the union to withdraw one area from the jurisdiction
of the Joint Board, while ostensibly remaining a party to Joint Board
17
procedures.

Although the Board refuses to render a decision under section 10(k),
it will proceed with an unfair labor practice complaint against a union
which will not comply with a private settlement. In Wood, Wire & Metal
Lathers Union (Acoustical Contractors Ass'n),118 the Board held that
111
112
113
114

Ironworkers Ass'n, 137 N.L.R.B. 1753 (1962) (Armco Drainage & Metal Prods. Co.).
Millwrights, 121 N.L.R.B. 101 (1958) (Don Cartage Co., Inc.).
Ironworkers Ass'n, 137 N.L.R.B. 1753 (1962) (Armco Drainage & Metal Prods. Co.).
Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 137 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1962) (Nichols Elec.

Co.).
115 International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1963) (George E. Miller
Elec. Co.); ci. Local 181, Intl Union of Operating Eng'rs, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1964)
(Service Elec. Co.).
116 See Farmer 670-71.
117 Thus the IBEW submits disputes to the joint Board dealing with "inside work" but
refuses to submit disputes dealing with "outside work." Local 181, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1964) (Service Elec. Co.).
118 119 N.L.R.B. 1345 (1958); ci. Local 46, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union, 120
N.L.R.B. 837 (1958) (Bldg. Trades Employers Ass'n).
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an 8(b)(4)(D) charge would be dismissed only upon compliance with
the Board's decision "or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute,"
and not merely if a method of settlement existed. Thus, the existence of
a method of adjustment precludes a 10(k) hearing, but not the issuance
of an 8(b)(4)(D) complaint if the method is not successful. The
"statute keeps the charge alive pending a final settlement ... so that an
8(b) (4) (D) complaint action may be taken against a party that resorts
to a jurisdictional strike despite the existence of an agreed method of
adjustment."" 9
The Board's position makes it an enforcement arm of a private
agency. Since many private settlements do not provide effective enforcement devices, this approach seems to comport with the congressional
policy of settling jurisdictional disputes and encouraging private settlements. Furthermore, an opposite approach would permit a party to
secure redetermination by the Board by refusing to abide by an unfavorable Joint Board determination. 12 0 Although the Board is merely
proscribing conduct covered by 8(b) (4) (D), it is in effect enforcing
the private settlement. The Board, however, has no means of enforcing
the private settlement against a recalcitrant employer. The successful
union which continues to strike is engaged in conduct literally encompassed by section 8(b) (4) (D) and yet there is no lack of compliance
on its part. When the employer is obstructing the private settlement,
however, and the respondent union has "complied" with Board procedures, the Board will probably dismiss the charge.' 2 1
STANDARDS
Despite the apparent command in section 10(k) to "hear and determine" the dispute, the Board until 1961 had limited its inquiry under
section 10(k) to whether the striking union had representational rights
with respect to the employees performing the work under a prior Board
order or certificate or under a collective bargaining contract. If not,
the union would be prohibited from attempting to override the employer's assignment.22 In 1961 the Supreme Court decided that the
119 Wood, Wire &Metal Lathers Union, 119 NL.R.B. 1345, 1352 (1958) (Acoustical Contractors Ass'n). It is arguable that "such voluntary adjustment" refers to the "agreed upon
methods" mentioned in the first sentence of § 10(k). Congress may have wanted the Board
to stay out of any dispute where there was an agreed upon method of settlement.
120 International Bhd. of Teamsters, 97 N.L.R.B. 1003 (1952) (William F. Traylor); see
Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1150, 1162-63 (1960).
121 Note, 73 HAv. L. Rav. 1150, 1163 n.68 (1960).
122 See, e.g., International Bhd. of EIec. Workers, 124 NJL.R.B. 323 (1959) (Peacock
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NLRB's construction of section 10(k) was too narrow, 123 and refused
to enforce a Board order finding a violation of section 8(b)(4)(D)
because the Board had not made an affirmative award of the work in
the prior 10(k) proceeding, but had merely decided that respondent
union was not entitled to the work under an outstanding certificate or
contract.
The Board's brief set forth several arguments to justify its narrow
construction of section 10(k). These arguments are set forth briefly here,
since they are relevant to an understanding of the Board's subsequent
decisions. It is worthy of note, however, that the problems expressed by
the Board have generally not been solved.
(1) Section 10(k) sets forth no standards by which the Board is to
determine jurisdictional disputes. The Court, however, speaking of the
NLRB, felt confident that the Board could design standards for the
resolution of jurisdictional disputes.
It has had long experience in hearing and disposing of similar labor problems.
With this experience and a knowledge of the standards generally used by arbitrators, unions, employers, joint boards. and others in wrestling with this problem, we
are confident that the Board need not disclaim the power given it for lack of standards. Experience and common sense will supply the grounds for the performance
124
of this job which Congress has assigned the Board.

(2) The broader interpretation of section 10(k) would conflict with
other sections of the Labor Management Relations Act in three ways.
First, the interpretation may cause unions to compel employers to discriminate with regard to employment. The prevailing organization may
acquire a greater form of union security than is allowed by sections
8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2)."5 If the winning union displaced an incumbent
union, the displaced employees would be affected because of their union
membership. The Court stated that this was not relevant in this case
since both groups of employees were organized. Moreover, the Board
"will devise means of discharging its duties under section 10(k) in a
manner entirely harmonious with those sections." 2" The Board's objection, however, is a broader one. Even though both groups of employees
Constr. Co.); Lodge 68, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 81 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1949) (Moore Drydock
Co.).
123 NLRB v. Radio &Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
124 364 U.S. at 583.
125 LMRA § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958); LMRA § 8(b)
(2), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958).
126 364 U.S. at 584.
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were organized and employed by CBS, an award in favor of the striking
to reassign or displace employees
union might cause the employer
2 7
presently doing the work.1

Second, section 30312 permits suits for damages because of jurisdictional disputes. Section 10(k), however, is not applicable even though
the same conduct is covered under sections 303 and 8(b) (4) (D). Thus,
if the Board were to give effect to factors other than those in sections
8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k), the "substantial symmetry" of sections 303
and 8(b)(4)(D) would be lost. Since section 303 does not permit the
union to establish as a defense in a suit for damages the fact that it
is entitled to the work on the basis of factors such as custom or tradition, the Board could sanction what has been declared unlawful under
section 303. The Court, holding that substantive symmetry between
sections 303 and 8(b) (4) (D) was not required, did not decide what
effect a Board decision under section 10(k) might have on actions
under section 303.' Symmetry, of course, would also be in danger in
a section 303 action held before a 10(k) hearing when the union
attempts to claim that it is entitled to the work.
Third, section 10(k) could sanction what section 8 (b) (4) (D) forbids.
An outside union could win on custom or tradition, for example, but
the narrow exception to section 8(b) (4) (D) ° does not include a 10(k)
award, and the union would still be guilty of an unfair labor practice.
The 10(k) award would then become meaningless to the union. 13 1 Alternatively, a 10 (k) award, if included in "order" in section 8 (b) (4) (D),
could not retroactively validate a jurisdictional strike, the legality of
which depends on the circumstances existing at the time it arose. This
problem is bound up with the fact that no procedures exist to compel
compliance with a 10(k) award by an unwilling employer. 3 2 Thus a narrow reading of section 8(b) (4) (D) could lead to a situation where the
respondent union receives a work assignment, but the employer refuses
to assign the work and the initial strike still violates the act.
Neither of these two problems was faced by the Court. The initial
127
128

See Farmer 685-90; McGuinn 107-08.
LMRA § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.

§ 187 (Supp. V, 1964).
129 364 U.S. at 584-85.
130 By its terms § 8(b) (4) (D) governs "unless such employer is failing to conform to an
order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees
performing such work."
131
132

Mann 54 n.317.
Id. at 53-54.
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problem set forth in the Board's brief may not arise, because section
10(k) states that a charge will be dismissed "upon compliance by the
parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board." 8 If a striking
union is awarded the work it will certainly comply, and noncompliance
by the other parties will not cause a cease and desist order to be issued
against it. On the other hand, the charge remains to induce compliance
when the striking union is not awarded the work.
(3) The Board further contended in CBS that a broader reading of
section 10(k) would discourage private settlements. The Court held that
this was a "policy determination" that was implicitly settled by the Congress' enactment of section 10(k). 111
The Board's general position had been challenged by the National
Joint Board.385 The Board's stand, argued the Joint Board, induced contractors to disassociate from the Joint Board since a decision under
section 10(k) was more likely to be favorable to the employer. The Joint
Board felt that only if the two hearings were parallel, thus eliminating
the tactical advantage of a 10(k) hearing, would private agreements be
strengthened. The NLRB's position, it contended, had permitted contractors to disturb customs and established practices of industry, which
in turn increased, rather than reduced, jurisdictional warfare.
BoARD CRiTERIA

In InternationalAss'n of Machinists (J. A. Jones Constr. Co.),130 the
first case following CBS in which an affirmative award was made, the
Board set forth the guidelines that it would follow.
At this beginning stage in making jurisdictional awards as required by the Court,
the Board cannot and will not formulate general rules for making them. . . .The
Board will consider all relevant factors in determining who is entitled to the work
in dispute, e.g., the skills and work involved, certifications by the Board, company
and industry practice, agreements between the unions and between employers
and unions, awards of arbitrators, joint boards and AFL-CIO in the same related
cases, the assignment made by the employer and the efficient operation of the
employer's business. This list of factors is not meant to be exclusive, but is by
way of illustration. The Board cannot, at this time, establish the weight to be
given the various factors. Every decision will have to be an act of judgment based
on common sense and experience rather than on precedent. It may be that later,
133 LMRA § 10(k), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1958).
'34 364 U.S. at 383.
185 Brief for the Joint Board as Amicus Curiae, pp. 59-63, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers

Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 1354 (1958) (Acoustical Contractors Ass'n).
136 135 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962).
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with more experience in concrete cases, a measure of weight can be accorded the
13 7
earlier decisions.

The relative weight given to various criteria set out in Jones has varied
considerably from case to case. 18 The results have generally favored the
employer's assignee; the vast majority of the awards have been made
in favor of the union to whom the work was originally assigned. One author suggests that this is not coincidental.' 89 On the other hand, the
opposite result has generally been reached by the Joint Board. 40 Such
evidence raises doubts as -to whether the Board is adequately carrying out
the Court's mandate. Furthermore, such a policy, if being purposely followed by the Board, would hardly encourage employers to participate in
private proceedings.
The post-CBS cases present a tremendous variety of factual situations
which, when combined with the list of criteria set out by the Board,
makes analysis and identification of coherent doctrine difficult. For this
reason the cases will be discussed in categories determined by significant
factors or important problems.
THE EMPLOYER'S ASSIGNMENT

Some cases may properly turn on the employer's choice. The striking
union, for instance, may present no evidence supporting its claim.' 41 However, the use of the employer's assignment as an independent factor in a
doubtful case raises some problems, and the required burden of proof
could prejudically favor the employer. It is arguable, however, that it is
completely proper for the Board to require the striking union to present
some justification for its claim. Although it might be maintained that
any burden of proof is inconsistent with the Board's duty to "determine
the dispute," perhaps it is justifiable at this point to stress the interest
in protecting the employer. Furthermore, this approach may discourage
groundless disputes. There is even a third position which would place
the burden of justification upon the employer who initiated the dispute,
as well as the NLRB intervention. Such an approach is not unreasonId. at 1410-11.
O'Donoghue 321-23.
189 Id. at 322. See also Cohen, NLRB and Section 10(k): A Study of the Reluctant
Dragon, 14 LAB. LJ. 905, 918 (1963). In Detroit Mailers Union, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1964)
(Detroit Gravure Corp.), in which the employer's assignment was not upheld, the Board felt
it relevant to mention that the employer did not care which employee group received the
work.
137
138

140 O'Donoghue 322.
141

Local 862, Treasurers Alliance, 137 N.L.R.B. 738 (1962) (Allied Maintenance Co.).
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able, and analogies may be found in concepts, such as "discharge for
cause," which are employed in arbitration cases.
The employer's assignment is often considered as a factor separate
and distinct from his past practice. 142 Moreover, the employer's assignment has often been buttressed by other factors which are not really
independent. 4 Thus, the assignment may be upheld partly because the
employees are sufficiently skilled to perform the disputed work and have
done it to the employer's satisfaction. 144 Even the fact that the assignment
conforms to past practice may mean only that the employer wished the
groups to do the work, that the particular division of work is efficient and
economical, or that the respondent union has acquiesced in this division
in the past. In one case," 5 the Board emphasized that electrical work had
been given to the employer's mechanics on three occasions in the past.
IBEW pointed out, however, that each of these assignments drew a
protest from other IBEW locals. In this case IBEW offered as evidence
the custom in the area, the international's constitution which allegedly
covered the work, and a collective bargaining contract with the local
Electrical Contractors Association recognizing IBEW as the representative of all employees "within its jurisdiction" and covering all "electrical
construction." Nevertheless, the employer's assignment to its own mechanics was upheld, even though the assignment was the only substantial
evidence favoring that group.
The Board's consideration of the employer's assignment, which is accorded little weight before the Joint Board, would seem to weaken the
use of private settlement machinery to the extent that parties can get
better treatment before the NLRB.
TRADITIONAL JURISDICTIONAL LINES

The National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes, created by the Building Trades Department, AFL-CIO, and general and specialty contractors associations, attempts to afford protection
to traditional jurisdictional lines.'4 6 Such recognition of the concept of
142 See, e.g., Carpenters Council, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (1964) (J. 0. Veveto & Son);
New York Mailers' Union, 137 N.L.R.B. 665 (1962) (New York Times Co.).
143 See Carpenters Council, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (1964) (Stephen Gorman Bricklaying

Co.).
144 See, e.g., New Orleans Typographical Union, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1964) (E. P. Rivas,
Inc.); Local 964, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 141 N.L.R.B. 1138 (1963) (Carleton Bros. Co.).
145 Local 38, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 137 N.L.R.B. 1719 (1962) (Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co.).
146 Dunlop 496-98; see STRAND 94-104.
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job ownership would seem to be a requirement of any plan evolved by

the industry itself.147 The NLRB, however, has rejected this concept,
even though craft lines are often maintained in nonunion firms in the
construction industry. 4 ' Although the Board's "failure to utilize this
property concept" may be a failure to appreciate fully the "unique characteristics of the construction industry,"' 4 the Board's reluctance may be
a recognition of problems arising from sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) of
the LMRA. 1 °
The Board's reluctance was illustrated by a dispute between operating engineers and the plumbers over certain pipe connections of refrigeration equipment.-'' The employer had assigned the work to the operating engineers, although the work was included among the skills and
duties traditionally performed by plumbers. The Board stated that
it had to decide between two groups of employees, and that thus the
name of the union was of little significance. This approach, although consistent with the language of section 10(k), weakens reliance upon
traditional work divisions. The plumbers showed "clear and uncontradicted evidence" that they had for some time represented journeymen
in this area. Indeed, the employer had used plumbers for this work for
three years. The engineers conceded that this was traditionally plumbers'
work and their regional director admitted that the disputed work was
regular pipefitting work which the plumbers were entitled to perform.
Despite this evidence, the employer's assignment to the engineers was
upheld. The Board stated that the work required less skill than is
involved in normal plumbers' work, that the employees were sufficiently
skilled to perform the work, and that the employer had assigned them
the work. Ironically, the Board admitted that this work was an "elementary part of the plumbing and pipefitting craft." Thus, it appears
that although nearly all of the substantive evidence favored the plumbers,
nonetheless the employer's assignment apparently was the determining
factor. The Board ignored the regional director's view, arguing that it was
based only on traditional positions. His opinion "was not directed to the
147 STRAND 103; see Dawson, Hollywood's Labor Troubles, 1 IND. & LAB. REL. Rav. 643
(1958).

148 See Daniel Constr. Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 264 (1961).
149 O'Donoghue 324.

150 LMRA § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958); LMRA
§ 8(b)(2), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958). For a discussion of these
sections see p. 139 infra.
151 Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters, 136 N.L.R.B. 1641 (1962)
ditioning Corp.).

(AI-Boro Air Con-
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merits of competing claims for pipefitting work where lesser and higher
skilled workmen quarrel
over the right to do the simpler forms of the
152
work of their trade.1
Shortly thereafter, the Board made another award in opposition to
traditional work jurisdiction in Local 991, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n
(Union Carbide Chem. Co.). 3 The company, Union Carbide, had
changed its method of operation so that its own employees, represented
by the Texas City Metal Trades Council, performed ship-loading work
previously done by a contractor using longshoremen. The employer built
its own container dock when it began using aluminum containers rather
than paper bags. The ILA had always loaded cargo in the area, including
that of Carbide. The Board, in upholding the employer's assignment,
found the work to be only an extension of shipping functions currently
carried on and an integral part of the plant's operations. It found that the
present employees were capable of performing the work and stated that
no general cargo was loaded at the container dock. Furthermore, the
work was not steady, and Carbide's employees worked throughout the
plant wherever they were needed. The work was similar to some work
performed in the plant and, as the employees worked part time in the
plant, the longshoremen would not have been full time employees.
Member Brown, dissenting, argued that ILA's traditional work jurisdiction should control. The Jones" factors could not be "accorded
meaningful implementation," he argued, unless the work was awarded
to the ILA.'55 The loading was virtually identical to work done by ILA
in the past, albeit through a common carrier. Furthermore, there was
no evidence that the Trades Council had ever made any jurisdictional
claim to the work or that the employees had ever worked as longshoremen. The change in 6peration, he argued, was in reality a switch of
assignment of the work to a new group of employees.' 50
Failure by the Board to follow traditional lines may lead to continued
jurisdictional strife.""T Traditional "rights" or jurisdictional boundaries
152

Id. at 1647.

153 137 N.L.R.B. 750 (1962).
'54 International Ass'n of Machinists, 135 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1410-11 (1962)
(J. A. Jones
Constr. Co.); see text accompanying note 137 supra.
155 137 N.L.R.B. at 760.
156 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in enforcing the Board's
order, fully agreed that the factor of trade jurisdiction should not be disregarded, but found
substantial evidence to support the Board's award. NLRB v. Local 991, Intl Longshoremen's

Ass'n, 332 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir. 1964).
157 After the decision in Union Carbide, the ILA notified the Board that it did not intend
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have been accorded deference for many years in most industries,1 5 and
unions will continue to dispute assignments which they consider to be in
opposition to their traditional jurisdiction. 5 9 Furthermore encouraging
employers to follow such lines would decrease the number of jurisdictional
disputes, 160 and use of this criteria by the Board would make that body's
awards more predictable. 6 '
A meaningful jurisdictional standard should consider the nature
of the functions performed and the equipment used, and at least one
NLRB case has followed this rationale. 162 Utilization of this approach
would cause Board awards more closely to parallel those of arbitrators
and the Joint Board. Even though application of this standard may
weaken the employer's interest in a 10 (k) proceeding,
attention should be focused on the competing claims of the two unions involved,
rather than on the interests of the employer. Statutory compulsion has been
brought to bear on the problem for the purpose of eliminating the social waste and
the loss to innocent parties resulting from stoppages caused by work assignment
disputes-not for the purpose of forcing a more rational and efficient distribution
of labor in areas in which craft work predominates. 1 63
EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY

Employers will consider the efficiency and wage scale of the particular
workers as significant factors in making jurisdictional awards. The
former criterion would seem more proper for use by the Board than the
latter. Although the Board has stated that labor costs cannot be
determinative in deciding jurisdictional disputes, they are one of the
relevant factors to be considered. 6 4 Use of comparative wage rates by
the Board would not discourage disputes, however. Indeed, unions
to comply with the award. Since an 8(b) (4) (D) charge is only dismissed upon compliance,
the Board held an unfair labor practice hearing. A cease and desist order was issued since
the union's only defense was that the 10(k) award was erroneous. See Local 991, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 139 N.L.R.B. 1152 (1962) (Union Carbide Corp.).
168 Some agreements and decisions of record based upon traditional jurisdiction antedate
the existence of the NLRB by thirty years. O'Donoghue 325.
159 This factor is arguably irrelevant. Congress made jurisdictional strikes illegal despite
the fact that the assignment may have violated even clear traditional jurisdictional lines.
160 Note, 73 HAav. L. RFv. 1150, 1164 (1960).
161 See Cohen, supra note 139, at 918.
162 Local 825, Int'l Union Operating Eng'rs, 139 N.L.R.B. 1426 (1962) (Schwerman Co.).
163 Hyman 456.
164 Local 46, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union, 136 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1962) (Precrete,
Inc.). See also Local 499, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (1963) (Iowa
Power & Light Co.).
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with lower wage scales would be encouraged to extend their jurisdictional claims. As one author points out, jurisdictional disputes are often
caused at the border line of craft jurisdiction because of the wage rate
differential."6 5 Thus, use of this factor would add 6fuel to existing problems
and "breed bitter resistance and antagonism."1
Efficiency, on the other hand, is a more appealing criterion. It may
refer either to the nature of the operation, or the competence of the
workers involved. The nature of the work itself may aid in determining
the work assignment. In one case 1 7 for instance, the Board upheld an
assignment to the lathers of certain work involving the installation of
nailing bars on a suspended ceiling. The Board found it significant that
the use of carpenters would involve installing temporary ceiling bars,
necessitating duplication of effort. 6 8 Admittedly, time and costs are components of efficiency. This factor, however, does not present the difficulties
mentioned above in reference to comparative wage scales. 10
Since the competence of the workers involved to perform the disputed
work must, of course, be considered, the respondent must be able to
demonstrate that its members can perform the task "at least in a way
which will meet the standards of performance normally applicable in the
trade or industry."' 7 0 The Board usually mentions competence but has
apparently accorded this factor little weight. It is clear, however, that
the more difficult question involves the relative skill of the competing
employee groups.
165 Dunlop 485.
166 Hyman 454. If a task has "traditionally been performed by a craft, and calls for the
tools and skills normally exercised by the members of that craft, the task should not be taken
from that craft merely because a more economical flow of work could be secured by shifting
it to a different craft and because a union can be found to assert a claim to it." Id. at 455.
The author acknowledges, however, that there are limits to the worker's interest in security.
Ibid. Economical conduct of the work should be recognized only where the disputed work
involves a new task created by changes in materials or techniques. Compare Address by
MembeK Brown, Convention of Alaska State Federation of Labor, Sept. 17, 1962, in 51
L.R.R.M. 103, 105 (1963); pp. 124-28 infra.
167 United Bhd. of Carpenters, 139 N.L.R.B. 591 (1962) (0. R. Karst); see New Orleans
Typographical Union, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1964) (E. P. Rivas, Inc.).
168 Cf. Local 964, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 141 N.L.R.B. 1067 (1963) (Carleton Bros.
Co.). See also Local 1, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1964) (McDonnell
Aircraft Corp.).
169 Hyman 454.
170

Id. at 452.
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SKILL

Where a high degree of skill is required, it seems justifiable to give
weight to this factor.17 ' The opposite approach, however, may be inappropriate. Work has been assigned to less skilled laborers when no need
was found for the abilities of the higher skilled union. 2 Similarly, work
has been assigned to less skilled production workers where the use of
73
skilled machinists was not necessary to the performance of -the work.1
However,
most skilled work involves some operations that can be isolated and performed
relatively easily. There appears to be no good reason why the settlement of work
a factor in determining the extent to which
assignment disputes should become
174
jobs are to be thus broken down.

Furthermore, it is critical to a craft union's economic position to have
versatile members able to perform a number of tasks. Public policy
would not be furthered by the 5use of factors which in themselves often
cause jurisdictional disputes.7
SIMILARITY TO PAST PROCESSES AND SUBSTITUTION OF FUNCTIONS

The above sections demonstrate the need to recognize to some extent
the traditional jurisdiction of the unions and the worker's interest
in job security. This latter interest is often affected when new material or
technological changes are introduced. Such changes are a common cause
of jurisdictional disputes, often resulting in a decrease of work opportunities for a particular union.' 76 When tasks are replaced by the introduction
of new materials or equipment, the Board has recognized the claim of
workers who had performed the similar work in the past. In Local 681,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists (American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp.), 77 the machinists had been operating planers, one of which was
replaced by a timesaving machine. The assignment to the machinists was
upheld, based in a large part on the historical operation of the predecessor
machine by that group. Similarly, when an employer, a television and
171 See Local 22, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 141 N.L.R.B. 1047 (1963) (Federal Elec.
Corp.); Local 1266, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 137 N.L.R.B. 68 (1962) (William Matera,

Inc.).
172 International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962) (Frank P. Badolato
& Son).
173 Lodge 681, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 135 N.L.R.B. 1382 (1962) (P. Lorillard Co.).
174 Hyman 454.

175 See Dunlop 485.
170 Id. at 488-89; STRANo 41-44.
177 137 N.L.R.B. 1524 (1962).
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radio station, replaced his records with magnetic tape equipment, the indexing and filing of tapes were assigned to workers who had filed records
17
in the past.
In the cases referred to above the new work did not require new
skills, nor did it fall directly within the jurisdiction of another union.
When these facts do exist, the Board must choose between employees
who possess the necessary skills and have traditionally performed the
work in question, and employees who have performed functionally similar
work in the past but whose function has now been replaced. Job security
at this point meets its severest test, as it may run counter to traditional
work boundaries. Although the Board has not met the problem in these
terms, it is clear that the problem of job security and employment has influenced some awards. 79 An example may be found in Philadelphia
Typographical Union (PhiladelphiaInquirer),'"'one of the most significant post-CBS cases to date. In 1959 the employer-newspaper introduced
a new process, called photocomposition, and a new piece of equipment
called a linofilm machine. Photocomposition, a substitute for the older
"hot metal" process which used molten metal for the creation of type,
employs a photographic principle. The work in dispute-darkroom tasks
of developing the film and sensitized paper and printing of "velox" prints
-was assigned by the employer to the typographers. The Newspaper
Guild argued that its photographers in the editorial department should
do the darkroom tasks."' A third group, the Photo-Engravers Union,
claimed the making of the velox prints. The employer argued that photocomposition was an integrated process, all parts of which should be
performed by members of the same union, and that typographers should
get the work because they did the hot metal work for which the new
process was a substitute. The ITU added that it had instituted schools
to train its members in the photocomposition process. The Guild replied
that its members already possessed the necessary skills, and that similar
darkroom photography had been done by them for years. Thus, the
178 Local 4, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 138 N.L.R.B. 335 (1962)

(Pulitzer Publishing

Co.).
179 International Printing Pressmen's Union, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (1964) (Kelley &
Jamison, Inc.); Denver Photo-Engravers' Union, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 137 (1963) (Denver
Publishing Co.); Local 681, Intl Ass'n of Machinists, 137 N.L.R.B. 1524 (1962) (American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.).
180 142 N.L.R.B. 36 (1963), 38 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1184 (1963).
181 The Guild invoked its grievance procedure; the arbitrator decided in favor of the
Guild but expressly stated that he would not and could not pass on the rights of the
typographers.
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problem was posed: to what extent shall interest in job security outweigh
traditional jurisdictional lines?
The Board split four ways, three members upholding the assignment
to the typographers. The majority opinion of Chairman McCulloch and
Member Fanning 82 based the determination on two "novel" grounds:
(1) that photocomposition is a substitute for hot metal processes done
previously by the typographers and (2) that a contrary assignment
could result in a loss of employment for typographers. They found
that the Board's usual criteria were of no help, and that the collective
bargaining contract and the union constitution of each of the three
unions could be construed to cover the work. The skills were similar,
ITU members having been specially trained to handle this new process,
and there was no past practice or clear industry custom. Under these
circumstances, they felt, the Board should call upon what the Court in
CBS termed "experience and common sense." It was noted that photocomposition and other photographic processes were gradually replacing
hot metal methods of composition, and that both processes fulfill the same
function in the production of newspapers. Photocomposition, however,
requires new skills. The introduction of these new processes, it was
therefore found, threatened the jobs of typographers who have always
performed composing room work but have only recently acquired photographic skills.
In response to these changes the ITU had established schools to retrain
its members in order to retain their jobs as new methods were introduced.
The Board (Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning) assumed that
the particular typographers assigned to the work had the necessary
training and skills, and implied that the typographers may even possess
greater skills because the Guild and photo engravers had not performed
darkroom work in connection with composing a newspaper. Significantly,
the Board mentioned that the Guild and photo engravers would not
"lose even one hour of work they had previously done," whereas a
contrary assignment could cause the discharge of typographers. Thus,
to overturn the assignment would take away employment of typographers
and open up new opportunities for the other two unions. The Board was
careful to point out that it relied "particularly on the fact that photocomposition is a substitute for the earlier 'hot metal' process" previously
done by typographers."" Thus, "loss of jobs," though discussed at
182 Member Rodgers concurred.
183 142 N.L.R.B. at 43.
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length, was de-emphasized. This factor, however, is doubtless a component of the "substituted functions" factor.
Member Rodgers, justifiably intimating that Member Fanning and
Chairman McCulloch had introduced "new criteria," concurred on a
ground which seemed more consistent with the prior Board policy of
giving "substantial, if not decisive, weight" to the employer's assignment
in cases where all claims have some validity. He would "upset such assignment only in the face of circumstances which virtually compelled
a contrary result," thus following prior decisions which seem to have
turned, either expressly or impliedly, on the employer's assignment when
factors were in balance, or when the respondent union introduced no
significant evidence. 18 4
In his dissent Member Leedom found no need to discuss "socioeconomic" factors since the work should have been assigned to the
Guild based on past criteria.' 8 5 The Guild, he noted, had done similar
darkroom work and possessed the necessary skills. He found the ITU's
training courses irrelevant because, since any employee could attend
school and learn the skills necessary for a job, the "skills" criterion could
become meaningless. The fact that new skills were required, he argued,
made irrelevant the rationale that the new process was a substitute for
an older process. The reasoning of the dissent, however, evades the fact
that both groups possess the necessary skills. Surely a "skill" criterion is
meaningless where both employee groups possess adequate skills; and
no showing was made that Guild members possessed higher skills.
The majority's willingness to broaden the 10(k) inquiry beyond the
criteria used in past cases is explained by its realization that there are
no fixed factors in jurisdictional dispute cases, and that such cases must
be decided on their own facts rather than on rigid precedent. The list
of factors in Jones was not meant to be exclusive; the relevance of
various factors depends upon their applicability to particular factual
situations, with the ultimate view toward resolving the dispute in accord
with congressional policy.
Although Member Leedom deprecates the introduction of "socioeconomic" factors in 10(k) proceedings, 8 6 it seems that at least three
184 New York Printing Pressmen's Union, 143 N.L.R.B. 167 (1963) (Stuyvesant Press
Corp.).
185 142 N.L.R.B. at 44. Member Brown, dissenting, would have assigned the work to the
Guild but did not endorse Leedom's dissent in its entirety. Id. at 47.
186 Unimpressed with the "loss of jobs" factor, Member Leedom pointed out that there
was no evidence as to the kind of reorganization which would take place due to the intro-
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members of the Board are concerned with the impact of automation.8 7
In Machinists Union (P. Lorillard Co.) 1 8 8 the employer installed ciga-

rette packaging machines which eliminated hand packing of cartons.
The company assigned the work of adjusting the machines to the Tobacco
Workers Union rather than to machine shop workers represented by
IAM who had done the repair work on the old machines. The IAM's
certificate excluded fixers (machine adjusters) although a few machinists
had been retained as fixers under an agreement to permit them to retain
their jobs. The Board held that fixers were needed continuously, that
skills of machinists were not needed, and that the work was closely
related to the production process. In a later speech Member Brown
pointed out that the new machines would cost the jobs of seventy production workers, a fact not mentioned in the Lorillard opinion. He also felt
that the decision "weighs to the extent possible the impact of automation
on the production workers."'8 9 Since the employer's past practice, Board
certificates and industry practice favored the tobacco workers, it is
significant that Member Brown referred to the "socio-economic" factors
inherent in the case.
Furthermore, the Board has explicitly recognized the "loss of jobs"
factor. In Denver Photo-Engravers Union (Denver Publishing Co.),190
the Board mentioned that its award would not cause respondent's members to lose jobs, but that a contrary award would adversely affect the
jobs of the union members originally assigned the work. Such recognition
of the interest in job security seems justified, although awards employing this factor may not always be consistent with traditional jurisdictional lines. Although what one group loses as the result of a 10(k)
determination becomes another's gain, this fact does not "justify disregarding the relative importance of the task in question to both groups
in the light of industrial and technological developments."' 9 ' While the
duction of the new processes and the effect of the reorganization on job opportunities.
Id. at 46-47.
(Howard
187 See International Longshoremen's Union, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (1964)
Terminal), where the Board (Members Fanning, Brown and Jenkins) discusses the impact

of automation.
188 135 N.L.R.B. 1382 (1962).
189 Address by Member Brown, Convention of Alaska State Federation of Labor, Sept. 17,
1962, in 51 L.R.R.M. 103, 105 (1963).
190 144 N.L.R.B. No. 137 (1963). See also International Printing Pressmen's Union, 146
N.L.R.B. No. 186 (1964) (Kelley & Jamison, Inc.).
191 Hyman 451; see International Printing Pressmen's Union, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 186
(1964). But see New Orleans Typographical Union, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (1964) (E. P. Rivas,

Inc.).
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"loss of jobs" factor may not be legitimately determinative, it has the
value of easing, to some extent, the impact of technological change on
workers 192and may reduce union opposition to new techniques or machinery.
ACQUIESCENCE

The Board has occasionally used union acquiescence in past practices
or work assignments as a factor in 10(k) cases. In General Teamsters
Union (Snow White Baking Co.)' the work in dispute was delivery
of bread directly to retail stores. The employer had in the past employed driver-salesmen represented by the Teamsters Union, and had,
when necessary, used as drivers certain plant employees on a part-time
basis. In 1960 the company decided to eliminate most of its routes and
the driver-salesmen left its employ. Regular employees, however, continued to supply two retail stores. The union first objected five months
later when discussion of the renewal of the contract with the teamsters
began. The Board held that the teamsters had acquiesced in the employer's action because they had not complained about the occasional
deliveries in the past.
Members Fanning and Brown, in a vigorous dissent, would not impute
to the teamsters a "past intent" to relinquish their claim. Indeed, they
noted that the use of plant employees was instituted only to supplement
the carrying capacity of the driver-salesmen." 4 The failure to object to
the occasional deliveries should not, they felt, change the fact that the
driving in question was normally within the teamsters' jurisdiction.
Though the inside employees had performed the specific work in dispute
for some time, this was subsidiary to the main portion of delivery work;
furthermore, the dissenters pointed out, the system was instituted for
the driver-salesmen's convenience. Logic as well as traditional work
lines supports the position of the dissenters, who aptly characterized
the majority's position as requiring the respondent union to have objected, and perhaps struck, when the supplemental system was instituted. This would encourage workers to refuse to assist a "new helper"
on the job in order to avoid a Board ruling that by failing to object
at the proper moment they surrendered a part of their traditional work
claim. Such action would surely disrupt the employer's operation and
would not serve the long-run interest of either party. 193
192

Hyman 456.

193 137 N.L.R.B. 1473 (1962).
194 Id. at 1483.

195 See Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 137 N.L.R.B. 1451 (1962)

(Northern
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The "acquiescence" factor has not only been dubiously applied, but
has been over-extended. In Local 28, Int'l Stereotypers Union (Capital
Electrotype Co.) 196 the work of affixing electrotypes to Tympan sheets
had been done by pressmen for many years. When magnesium carriers
were substituted for Tympan sheets, electrotypers requested the work.
The Board held that the electrotypers' acquiescence in the work assignment for ten years was decisive even though the process had now been
changed. The disputed work, however, was "substantially similar" to
the old work which was found to be within the jurisdiction of the pressmen. Why the decision was not based solely on this latter point, or on the
similarity of processes, is not clear. The opinion appears inappropriately
to extend the doctrine of "acquiescence." Carried to an extreme, it
could be reasoned that whenever a new process is instituted the workers
who had performed the replaced work or process are entitled to operate
the new process since no other group had objected before.
An easy case is presented where one union has not objected to assignments of similar work over a long period of time, as in Pipefitters Union
(Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.) 19 7 where an employer's assignment to machinists of the job of installing guard rails was supportable
because machinists had for twenty years performed the same work.
There was no new process; the work in question was exactly that which
machinists had done in the past. Even though the work was covered
by the Pipefitters' constitution, that union had never claimed the work
or attempted to bargain for it. Acquiescence in such a case is no different
from the employer's past practice, a factor often considered by the
Board.
PRIVATE SETTLEMENTS: A PROBLEM OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

Since one of the aims of the 1947 legislation was to encourage private
settlements, it would seem that the Board should consider relevant, in
a 10(k) proceeding, evidence of decisions of private bodies or agreements
of the parties. Although private settlements or arbitration procedures
may not satisfy the exclusionary clause of section 10(k), decisions and
precedent of private arbitration machinery should have some impact
upon the merits of the 10(k) proceeding.
Metal Co.), where the ILA's acquiescence in the use of fifteen-man crews prohibited their
bringing pressure to compel twenty-two man crews despite the area practice requiring the
larger number.
196 137 N.L.R.B. 1467 (1962).
197 139 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1962).
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The National Joint Board 98
Decisions of the Joint Board were mentioned by the NLRB in Jones
as one of the factors to be used in determining 10(k) awards.'99 However,
this factor -hasbeen accorded only minimal weight. For example, in Local
1622, United Bhd. of Carpenters (0. R. Karst) 0 0 the carpenters submitted approximately 300 Joint Board decisions showing awards of similar work to carpenters over a twelve to thirteen year period. The Board
held that this evidence merely showed that the dispute was a long-standing one and that neither union had conceded to the other the right to
perform the work in dispute. The Board's cavalier rejection of Joint
Board precedents seriously undermines the statutory purpose of avoiding
jurisdictional disputes by refusing to aid in clarifying and enforcing
established jurisdictional lines. The fact that the dispute is a long-standing
one should not affect the value of the evidence. Further, the Board's assignment to the lathers may well encourage further jurisdictional strife,
since each union now has some precedent as authority for its position.
The Board's approach in Karst hampers the establishment of national
jurisdictional rules, and hardly encourages resort to Joint Board procedures. Unions which have lost past decisions before the Joint Board
will be encouraged to avoid that body and take their case to the Board. 10'
Apparently, the Board's narrow reading of the "agreed upon methods"
exclusion of section 10(k) has resulted in considerably less weight being
accorded to the determinations of the Joint Board. In Local 825, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs (Nichols Elec. Co.) 20 2 the engineers offered
in support of their position 130 recent Joint Board decisions. The Board
dismissed them, stating that there was no evidence that IBEW joined
in submitting any of these disputes to the Joint Board. IBEW is bound
by Joint Board determinations, however, even though it has steadfastly
refused to comply with its determinations involving line work. IBEW's
refusal to comply was emphasized by the Board to demonstrate that
198 The National joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes arose from an
agreement of October 17, 1949, entered into by the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL, the Participating Specialty Contractors Employers' Association and the
Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. See generally Dunlop, The Arbitration of
JurisdictionalDisputes in the Building Industry, in ARBiTATox TODAY 161 (1956).
199 135 N.L.R.B. at 1411.
200 139 N.L.R.B. 591 (1962).
201 See United Bhd. of Carpenters, 142 N.L.R.B. 163 (1963) (Berti Co.).
202 137 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1962).
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there was no agreed upon method of adjustment and to weaken the
evidentiary value of the award on the merits." 3 The Board held that the
Joint Board awards could not be given sufficient weight to offset the
other relevant considerations-a determination which seems to overstate
the weight actually given the awards by the Board. 4
The Board did give substantial weight to a federation ruling, however, in an early post-CBS case, 20 5 where, incidentally, the ruling was
consistent with the employer's assignment. Finding "no outstanding
equities in favor of the machinist as against the electrician operation of
the crane," the Board gave "substantial weight to the long-standing
rulings by the parent federation of both disputing unions that the operation of electric cranes . . . 'shall be Electrical Workers work.' ,,206 In

1922 the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL, decided.
07
that this type of work should be performed by electricians
On the other hand, little deference will be accorded the Joint Board
determinations when it does not address itself to the underlying dispute.
In Glaziers Union (PittsburghPlate Glass Co.) ,208 for instance, the em-

ployer had assigned work involving the moving of glass crates on a
construction project to laborers represented by Local 18, Hod Carriers
Union. Local 1778, Glaziers Union, representing outside glaziers and
inside handlers, induced a work stoppage. The Joint Board had decided in favor of the glaziers but it is clear that the NLRB regarded that
award as at best ambiguous since the successful union was the representative of both groups of "glaziers."2 °9 The work dispute was in reality between the outside glaziers and "all other nonskilled categories." The
Board's award, however, was in favor of the laborers and inside glaziers
whether represented by Local 18 or 1778 under their collective bargaining
203 A Joint Board award to respondent union will not be "controlling" where all parties
were not bound by it. Carpenters Council, 146 NJL.R.B. No. 114 (1964) (Stephen Gorman
Bricklaying Co.). Apparently, however, the award would not be controlling even if all parties
were bound. The real question involves the weight to be given an award.
204 Although the Board found it "highly probable" that operating engineers would bring
more skill and experience to the operation, it felt that IBEW members possessed sufficient
skills. The assignment to IBEW was upheld although the only substantive evidence favoring
that union, besides the employer's choice, was the employer's use of IBEW members since 1955
and some evidence that other employers in the state also used IBEW members.
205 International Ass'n of Machinists, 135 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962) (J. A. Jones Constr. Co.).
200 Id. at 1411.
207 PLAN Pon SETTLING JuRISDICTIONAL DIsPuTEs NATIONALLY AND LoCALLY 76-77 (1962).
This plan is commonly known as the Green Book.
208

137 N.L.R.B. 968 (1962).

209 Glaziers Union, 137 N.L.R.B. 975 (1962) (Binswanger Glass Co.).
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contracts covering inside warehouse employees. Thus, the Board awarded
the work to two competing unions. The Board refused to assign the work
solely to the inside glaziers because laborers had done "a major portion
of the work" during the past several years while Local 1778 had been
used to a lesser degree. As Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown
point out in their dissent, leaving two competing unions entitled to do the
work hardly decides the controversy.2 10
21
The Miami Agreement '
A tribunal faced with the "law" of another jurisdiction must interpret
that law. Such a problem faced the Board in Bricklayers Union (Consolidated Eng'r Co.) .212 The work in dispute was the installation of "drop
lines" from overhead T-valves down to assembly line locations where
wiring was to be done. Consolidated had received a general contract for
the construction of a large addition to a Chevrolet assembly plant. The
work was assigned by Chevrolet to its maintenance employees, represented by the United Auto Workers, rather than to the employees of
Consolidated, represented by the Building and Construction Trades Council. Chevrolet argued that it had not given this work to Consolidated under
its general contract.
The Council, on the other hand, argued that its pipefitters should
receive the work because it was part of "new construction," and was not
comparable to electrical or pipefitting work performed by production
or maintenance employees. Claiming that it was entitled to the work
on the basis of area and past company practice, the Council further
argued that under the Miami Agreement of 1958, the UAW had agreed
to cede new construction work to craft unions. The mediation team,
operating pursuant to the procedures of the Miami Agreement, was
unable to get the parties to agree, but did determine that the work
fell within the "new construction" provision of the Miami Agreement.
The Agreement was not a contract for binding arbitration, as the Board
137 N.L.R.B. at 974.
The Miami Agreement was made in 1958 between the presidents of the Building and
Construction Trades Department and the Industrial Union Department-subordinate groups
of the AFL-CIO. By its terms, "new" construction work was assigned to the building trades
unions and production and maintenance work to the industrial unions. Special teams were
set up to adjust disputes that arose between the two groups. The agreement admitted the
existence of a doubtful area in between, where decisions would have to be based on past
practices.
212 141 N.L.R.B. 119 (1962).
210
211
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pointed out, and neither party agreed to be bound by the conclusion
of either the initial investigatory team or the AFL-CIO Executive
Council.
Indicating that the UAW had never conceded its jurisdictional claim
in this case, the Board held that the Miami Agreement was not a firm
contract for arbitration, nor conclusive evidence that UAW had ceded
jurisdiction. The Agreement recognized a "doubtful area" between new
building construction and production and maintenance work in which
decisions should be based on past practices on an area, industrial or plant
basis. The Board held that the disputed work fell within this doubtful
area, a fact, the Board reasoned, which "must be conceded from the very
fact that the parties . . . were unable to agree upon its proper allocation. ' 218 Finding no difference in the skills of either union, that evidence
of past practice revealed a "mixed experience," and apparently no substantial evidence favoring either group, the Board assigned the work
to the UAW employees, thus upholding the employer's assignment. Indeed, the employer's assignment was the only significant factor remaining.
Employer-Union Agreements
Agreements between the employer and the striking union seem to have
been interpreted in such a way as to favor the employer's assignment.2 14
In Local 10, Int'l Longshoremen's Union (Matson Nay. Co.) 1 5 the work
in dispute was the assembly of lumber on the docks used by carpenters
in shoring cargo on board ships. Carpenters performed the shoring work,
but the longshoremen sought the assembly work. The employer's assignment to the carpenters was upheld. The International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union had always assembled lumber loads in Seattle,
Portland and Los Angeles. This was also true in San Francisco before
World War II, but carpenters began performing such work during the war
due to manpower shortages. A few contractors in San Francisco, however,
still used ILWU members. A provision in the contract between the ILWU
and the employers' association (PMA) stated that "Longshore work shall
include the following dock work... (e) the building of all loads on the
dock." The Board did not deal with this provision, perhaps deciding that
it was offset by Matson's past practice. It also ignored an arbitration
award under the contract to the ILWU. Matson's practice, however, as
213 Id. at 129-30.
214 See Local 46, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union, 136 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1962) (Precrete,
Inc.).
215 140 N.L.R.B. 449 (1963).
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pointed out above, was an exception to practice on the West Coast. 1l
Thus, the employer's assignment was upheld despite area practice, a contract clause and a contrary arbitration award.
The value of precedent in this area is well demonstrated by the recent
case of Longshoremen's Union (American Mail Line, Ltd.) 217 which involved the same parties and the same contract. In this instance the Board
awarded certain cargo handling operations to members of the ILWU
although the employer had originally assigned the work to the operating
engineers. The employer had changed his assignment, however, and had
given the work to ILWU members. Although other facts also favored
the ILWU, the Board found that the "most persuasive factor" was the
interpretation of the ILWU-PMA arbitrator that the work belonged to
the longshoremen under the parties' mechanization agreement. The
Board accepted the parties' urging to "honor their agreement as interpreted by them." In Matson, however, an arbitration award interpreting the same automation agreement2 18 and also awarding the work
to the ILWU was brushed aside because the Board usually gives such
awards no "significant weight unless all parties to a dispute have participated in the arbitration." Thus in both cases arbitration awards
between the same two parties and involving the same argreement favored
ILWUX's claim. One award was the "most persuasive factor" while the
other award received no "significant weight." It seems more than
coincidental that the Board's determination in both cases upheld the
employer's final award.2 1
There may have been greater significance to the Board's apparent
switch of policy, however. The changing nature of the arbitration process
is well demonstrated by the recent Supreme Court decision in Carey v.
Westinghouse,10 where the Court held that an employer must arbitrate
a work assignment dispute if one of the unions involved so requests.
Recognizing the fact that an arbitration award would not bind the second
union unless it intervened or were joined, the Court nevertheless stated
that
216 The Board conceded that there was no evidence of any superiority in skills, even
though carpenters at Matson serve a four year apprenticeship. Efficiency favored carpenters,
however, as it was thought efficient to have the selection of proper lumber on the docks
performed by the same worker who would use that lumber in the hold of the ship.
217 144 N.L.R.B. No. 138 (1963).
218 PMA-ILWU memo of agreement on mechanization and modernization.
219 See Longshoremen's Union, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 147 (1964) (Howard Terminal); Longshoremen's Union, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (1963) (Albin Stevedore Co.).
220 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
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arbitration may as a practical matter end the controversy or put into movement
forces that will resolve it .... Since § 10(k) not only tolerates but actively encourages voluntary settlements of work assignment controversies between unions,
we conclude that grievance procedures pursued to arbitration further the policies
2 21
of the Act

It is ironic that the court would require bilateral arbitration on an essentially trilateral controversy when the Board has consistently ignored
such awards. Since one union has not participated in the arbitration
proceedings, the Board's past approach seems justified. Although national
labor policy favors private settlements of disputes, as is clearly expressed by the exclusionary clause in section 10(k), surely an equally
important policy is the promotion of arbitration which will be "final
and binding." However, without intervention an arbitration award can222
not finally settle a work assignment dispute
Although a general critique of Carey is beyond the scope of this
article, it is significant to note this decision in light of American Mail
Line."23 Carey will probably have some effect upon the Board's resolution
of work assignment disputes. However, the Board's giving the decision
weight would conflict with its past, and more sound, approach to arbitration awards. Since the arbitrator bases his decision in large part upon the
collective bargaining contract, emphasizing this award would seem to
violate the Board's mandate to "hear and determine" the dispute. Furthermore, giving weight to the bilateral arbitration proceeding raises due
2 24
process problems
An employer-respondent union contract was used to reverse the employer's assignment in Printing Pressmen's Union (Stuyvesant Press
Corp.) ' 5 one of the few cases in which the Board awarded the disputed
work to the respondent union. The employer installed offset printing
presses in 1958 but subcontracted all offset preparation until 1962 when
part-time duties were assigned to a member of the ITU. However, in
1958, at the company's request, the local employer's association, of which
Stuyvesant was a member, had notified the pressmen that it recognized
their jurisdiction over the operation of offset presses. This letter was considered to be a contract by the Board and was made the basis of an
Id. at 265-66.
See Jones, Autobiography of a Decision: The Function of Innovation in Labor
Arbitration, and the National Steel Orders of Joinder and Interpleader, 10 U.CLA.L. REv.
987 (1963).
223 144 NL.R.B. No. 138 (1963).
224 Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261, 274-75 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
2r
143 N.L.R.B. 167 (1963).
221
222
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award to the pressmen. The company's preference was held "not persuasive" as the assignment was made after the "contract" with the
pressmen. Although the decisive factor was the 1958 agreement which
the Board, in effect, enforced, the Board noted that the work in question
constituted a normal accretion to the offset press work. The Board
also noted that in determining bargaining units it customarily includes
offset preparation employees in a unit of offset press employees as it is
clear that the former have a close commuity of interest with the latter.22 6
Generally, however, Board standards for the determination of bargaining
units do not seem appropriate for deciding jurisdictional disputes. 7
Inter-union Agreements
A statewide agreement between two disputing unions was given substantial weight in Local 68, Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Union (Acoustics & Specialties, Inc.),228 the first case to depart from the employer's
assignment. The employer assigned acoustical ceiling installation work
to its own employees, represented by the Carpenter's Union. The lathers
objected because of an agreement entered into between the two unions
which stipulated that the disputed work was to be within the jurisdiction
of the lathers. The company stated that it was not a party to the
agreement and was therefore not bound by it. As might be expected,
the inter-union agreement was held not to be an agreed upon method
of settlement.
The Board found that a balance existed between the equities of both
unions and that many criteria determinative in the past were not present.
There was no collective bargaining contract with either union; there
were no Board certifications; the skills possessed by members of both
unions were similar; company and area practice were split almost evenly;
and efficiency was apparently not materially affected because the employer had regnlarly used members of both unions to perform the disputed
work. Noteworthy is the fact that the carpenters could have prohibited
the Board from proceeding further by arguing that they did not claim
that the work was within their jurisdiction. The statement that a balance
of factors exists heralds either a new approach or the creation of new
factors.2" In cases in which both sides had equally impressive claims
226 Plimpton Press, 140 N.L.R.B. 876 (1963); Meredith Publishing Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 509

(1963).
227 Hyman

450.

228 142 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1963).
229 See Philadelphia Typographical Union, 142 N.L.R.B. 36 (1963) (Philadelphia Inquirer).
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or neither side had any substantial claim, the Board emphasized the
employer's assignment. In Jones the Board gave substantial weight to
a federation ruling when "no outstanding equities favored either union."
However, this ruling favored the union chosen by the employer.2380
In Acoustics & Specialties, on the other hand, the Board gave effect
to the inter-union agreement even though it was not consistent with the
employer's preference. The Board visualized its duty as being much like
that of an arbitrator,
balancing all of the interests involved and aiming at a solution which will, in its
judgment, finally resolve the dispute .... In attempting to resolve this dispute,
individual interests in a particular case may have to be subordinated to a practical
and effective solution of the overall problem.
As noted earlier the Carpenters-Lathers Agreement is an attempt by the Unions
to eliminate jurisdictional disputes between them. Like all compromises it satisfies
neither side completely, but is an attempt to replace the picket line by the bargaining table. That this solution may discommode an individual union member or
cause an employer to divide his work between the various crafts differently than
before the agreement cannot be gainsaid.231

Assuming that the factors are in balance, it is difficult to quarrel
with the Board's forthright approach. The employer's assignment has
been upheld in other cases in which the striking union had more substantial claims than that of the lathers in Acoustics & Specialties. Indeed,
since all traditional factors are neutral, what balances out the employer's choice? Apparently the Board decided that the union agreement
outweighed the employer's assignment.
Member Rodgers, dissenting, argued that the Board had improperly
applied the Jones criteria. He thought efficiency, as well as economy,
favored the carpenters, since carpenters were cheaper to employ and the
number of lathers in the area was small. 32 Furthermore, he argued, the
Board should not "enforce" the private agreement because the parties
had not abided by it, and its terms should not be imposed upon the employer since he was not a party to the agreement383 The basis of the
280 International Ass'n of Machinists, 135 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962)

(J. A.

Jones Constr. Co.).

N.L.R.B. at 1078-79. The majority added: "An employer's assignment of the
disputed work cannot be in all cases the controlling factor in determining jurisdictional disputes." Id. at 1079 n.4.
232 Recognition of this factor is important despite the prohibition of the dosed shop
because craft association and trade skills often create "the practical equivalent of the dosed
shop." Hyman 453.
233 142 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
231 142
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dissent, however, can only be that the application of traditional jurisdictional criteria favored the carpenters. The argument that the Board
is "enforcing"- a private agreement and "imposing" its terms on an
employer seems primarily rhetorical. Furthermore, since the agreement
was balanced against the employer's choice, the significance
of the fact
3 4
that the employer was not a party thereto diminishes
The Board's approach in Acoustics & Specialties would be approved
by those writers believing that the Board should focus on the competing
claims of the unions rather than on the employer's interests. 23 Such an
approach, however, follows the national policy of promoting private
settlement only if the employer is not required to be a party to the
private agreement. Carey may not be helpful on this question since one
of the two parties involved in that case was the employer. Since the
Board has held that the employer is a necessary party to any agreed
upon method of adjustment, 216 the weight the Board will give to an
inter-union agreement remains unclear. One writer has suggested that
such agreements should not be significant since the "two unions may
place greater emphasis on the need for agreement than on the effect of
the agreement on production and efficiency.1 237 The "need for agree-

ment," however, may be more important in relation to national policy
than "production and efficiency."
In any event, the Board appears to recognize limits to the application
of inter-union agreements. First, the Board will find there is no dispute
under section 8(b) (4) (D), and therefore none under section 10(k),
when one union does not claim the work, even though that union had
previously ceded the work tasks to the respondent union. 23 8 Second, the
inter-union agreement will not be accorded significant weight where the
Board finds the division of work to be "arbitrary." In Bricklayers Union
(Engineered Bldg. Specialties, Inc.) ,211 where two competing unions had
divided caulking work, the Board stated that
234 Member Leedom, dissenting, recognized the majority's balance but thought that the
assignment and the efficiencies outweighed this agreement. The employer's assignment, he
argued, should govern the result in the absence of countervailing factors of greater weight.
Id. at 1083.
235 See Hyman 456.
236 Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 139 N.L.R.B. 1426 (1962) (Schwerman

Co.).
237 STRANn 113.

238 Local 1905, Carpet Layers, 143 N.L.R.B. 251 (1963) (Southwestern Floor Co.). See
also Local 58, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 144 (1964) (Guardian Bldg.
Co.).
239 144 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (1963).
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such a division of the work would be arbitrary in nature, rather than based upon
legitimate jurisdictional claims. In our view, we would not be meeting our
to accept such an arbitrary division of
responsibilities under the Act if we were
240
the work as the basis for our award.

Although the contract division may not follow normal craft lines, it is
not clear why the agreement was "arbitrary." Certainly, as in Acoustics
& Specialties, it is justifiable to say that this was an "attempt by the
unions to eliminate jurisdictional disputes between them." Indeed, the
inter-union agreement in that case was given substantial weight although
it was not consistent with the employer's preference. Furthermore, the
Board has given effect in several cases to an employer's "arbitrary"
but practical
division of work based upon the destination of the finished
41
product
Third, the use of the interim agreement in Acoustics & Specialties was
predicated upon the existence of a "state of balance." In a recent case
involving the same unions, the agreement was not held determinative because past practice and efficiency favored the lathers. 42
THE

10(k) AWARD

AFFIRMATIVE AWARDS AND SECTION 8(a) (3)

Assuming that a decision on the merits is reached, problems remain
to be solved. Specifically, the formulation and enforcement of the award
must be determined. Soon after CBS the Board in Local 66, Int'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs (Frank P. Badolato & Son) 243 upheld the employer's work assignment to respondent union even though the employer
did not at that time employ any members of the respondent union. The
implication that an award may be in favor of an outside union has been
confirmed in later cases.244 Similarly,
it appears immaterial that the em24 5
ployer is not a neutral bystander
Even if both employee groups have the same employer there is still
Ibid.
See, e.g., New York Mailers' Union, 137 N.L.R.B. 665 (1962) (New York Times Co.),
where the employer divided work between deliverers and mailers on the basis of the ultimate
destination of the product.
242 Carpenters Council, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 133 (1964) (1. 0. Veveto & Son).
240
241

243 135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962).
244 See, e.g., Local 862, Treasurers

Alliance, 137 N.L.R.B. 738 (1962) (Allied Maintenance
Co.); United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing Indus., 144 N.L.R.B. No.
12 (1963) (Matt J. Zaich Constr. Co.).
245 Local 991, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 137 N.L.R.B. 750 (1962) (Union Carbide Chem.
Co.).
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the problem of assigning work on the basis of union membership. The
major Board objection to the granting of affirmative work assignments
before CBS was that the enforcement of 10(k) determinations by an
employer might, in the words of the act, encourage or discourage union
membership by "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment. 2 46 It seems clear that an award based upon union membership
would conflict with sections 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3).
Jurisdictional disputes can be distinguished from representational disputes because in the former, two or more unions seek the right to do
specific work for their members, not to change the union affiliation of
the other claimants of the work. The membership and representation
rights of the unions are not affected; the conflict is over the right to do
certain work and not to represent certain employees. The application of
section 8(a) (3), however, is based on whether job rights are affected
because of union membership; it does not turn on whether the discrimination is intended to change the union status of the employees discriminated against. 247 "[T]here is no substantial evidence that Congress
intended to subordinate the prohibition against discrimination to the
desire for jurisdictional peace.12 48 Since CBS expressly requires affirmative awards to be made, it seems obvious that such awards cannot be made
to a particular union. 49
The Board has attempted to avoid this problem by assigning the
work in dispute to certain employees but not to their union. Thus, in
Jones the Board assigned the disputed work to "electricians, who are
represented by the IBEW, but not to the IBEW or its members.1 250
Such an approach seems justifiable in light of the "trade, craft, or class"
language in section 8(b) (4) (D). 2 51 Thus, the Board made it clear in
EnterpriseAss'n of Pipefitters (All-Boro Air Conditioning Co.) 25 2 that it
must decide "which of two groups of employees is entitled to the
246 LMRA § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958); see Farmer
685-90.
247 See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); NLRB v. Oertel Brewing
Co., 197 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1952).
248 Farmer 687. But see NLRB v. Radio Eng'rs Union, 272 F.2d 713, 716 (2d Cir. 1954).
249 See generally Farmer 685-90.
250 135 N.L.R.B. at 1411.
251 This approach was suggested in the union's brief in CBS. "The Board need not even
make its determination in terms of the unions involved. It may resolve the jurisdictional
dispute in terms of crafts . .. ." Brief for Respondent, p. 41, NLRB v. Radio & Television
Broadcast Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
252 136 N.L.R.B. 1641 (1962).
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work," and, "the name of the incumbent union is of little consequence."2 3
In All-Boro pipe connecting work was assigned to operating engineers
even though the Board conceded that plumbers traditionally performed
the work. The Board will, therefore, look at the skills of employees
involved rather than the traditional jurisdiction of the unions to which
254
they belong.
Although it has been argued that a 10(k) determination cannot be a
defense to an 8(b)(2) charge, 55 the Board has decided that an award
to certain employees represented by a particular union, but not to the
union itself, can be a defense. In Local 502, Int'l Hod Carriers Union
(Cement-Work, Inc.), 256 the trial examiner, finding all the essentials
of an 8(b)(2) charge as well as a jurisdictional dispute under section
8(b) (4) (D), decided that all issues pertaining to the alleged jurisdictional dispute should be considered before the conduct could be treated
as a violation of any other section. The examiner, therefore, recommended dismissal of the 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) charges because the
challenged conduct was "inextricably interwoven" with a jurisdictional
dispute.
The Board agreed with the trial examiner's recommendation and held
that if the union's right to the work could be established it could assert
such right as a defense to the 8(b) (2) charge. Therefore, the act would
be effectuated by permitting the union to introduce evidence as to
whether its members were entitled to perform the work. Members
Rodgers and Leedom, dissenting, argued that jurisdictional dispute issues are not properly asserted as defenses to 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (1) (A)
charges25
The Board has apparently assumed either that the strong policy
against discriminatory displacement of employees has legislatively been
outweighed by the policy of settling jurisdictional disputes or, more likely,
that its awards to employees successfully avoid violations of section
8(b) (2). Admittedly, an employer's compliance with a Board award is
different from unilateral discrimination, but the courts and the Board
have been reluctant to compromise sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) in the
past.25 8 Furthermore, it would be difficult to hold that section 10(k), a
253 Id. at 1645.
254 Local 1, Bricklayers Union, 141 N.L.R.B. 119 (1962)

(Consolidated Eng'r Co.).
255 Local 502, Intl Hod Carriers Union, 140 N.L.R.B. 694, 695 (1962) (Cement-Work,
Inc.) (dissenting opinion).
250 140 N.L.R.B. 694 (1962).
257 Id. at 695; cf. Plumbers v. NLRB, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 100, 321 F.2d 366 (1963).
258 See Note, 50 GEo. L.J. 121, 133 (1961).
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procedural provision, conflicts with or modifies sections 8(a) (3) or
8(b) (2), substantive provisions which set absolute standards.
The importance of the discrimination issue, represented by the scope
and emotion of the congressional debate on the subject, should be contrasted with the rather haphazard manner in which section 10(k) was
incorporated into the act. Although Congress' failure to recognize the
inherent conflict involved in these sections cannot be justified, the omission may be explained by the fact that Congress' sole aim in the 1947
jurisdictional dispute deliberations was the protection of employers and
not protection of employee rights.259
Even if the Board does feel that its awards avoid the prohibitions of
sections 8(b) (2) and 8(a) (3), in making its awards, it nonetheless considers factors which deal directly with the union itself and not the particular employees in question. Thus, the Board looks at Board certificates,
collective bargaining contracts, traditional jurisdictional boundaries, union
constitutional provisions and area practice. The wording of the award,
therefore, cannot alter the fact that the employees' freedom from discrimination on the basis of union membership is compromised by the
work assignment.26 The verbal distinction, however, is based to some
extent on other factors used by the Board in 10(k) proceedings and may
be the most satisfactory way to harmonize the sections.
ENFORCEMENT

If the Board upholds the employer's assignment there is little difficulty
in enforcing the 10(k) award, since the 8(b) (4) (D) charge will simply
be dismissed upon compliance with the Board's award. 20 1 Noncompliance,
on the other hand, subjects the union to both an unfair labor practice proceeding and, possibly, a damage action under section 303. Little difficulty
would seem to be encountered where the respondent union is awarded
the work, the employer reassigns the work, and the union originally
assigned the work strikes. Although this union is a party to the dispute,
the unfair labor practice charge is directed against the other union.
The employer may desire Board action even though an action under section 303 may lie. He must file a section 8(b) (4) (D) charge, and a literal
Comment, 61 CoLua-. L. REV. 1142, 1153-57 (1961).
See Note, supra note 258, at 132. Compare Comment, supra note 259, at 1153-57
(1961), with Note, 73 HARv. L. Rmv. 1150, 1157 (1960).
261 "Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or
upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed." LMRA
§ 10(k), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1958).
259
260

1964]

JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES

reading of the act would seem to require another 10(k) proceeding. However, since the Board has already heard and determined the dispute, it
would seem reasonable to permit the Board to avoid unnecessary duplication.20 2
Difficulty arises, however, if the respondent union is awarded the work
by the Board and the employer refuses to comply.2 3s The act contains no

language which would make an award judicially enforceable against a
recalcitrant employer. Statutory procedure for enforcement of any Board
decision 2 4 is limited to "orders" issued after unfair labor practice proceedings, and the 10(k) award is not such an "order. 20 5 Failure of the
employer to act in accordance with the 10(k) award would also not be
an unfair labor practice since it is not a violation of section 8. A cease
and desist order may issue after a 10(k) proceeding, not because the
union is violating the Board's award, but because noncompliance removes the bar to the prohibition of section 8(b) (4) (D). Furthermore,
the successful employee group has no recourse under section 303 since
that section only provides a damage action for employers. Congress
apparently assumed that employers were generally neutral and would
voluntarily comply with Board awards 2 66
President Truman in .his veto message noted that Board determinations were ineffective against "parties to the dispute to whom the award
might be unacceptable. 2 0 7 The Board seems to have reached the same
conclusion 2 6 Furthermore, the National Labor Relations Act had not
contained any limitation on the employer's right to assign work 69
From the standpoint of labor policy, it has been argued that:
Compelling an employer to accept a Board determination that he assign specific
work to one group rather than another would be a totally unwarranted infringe262 Mann 53 n.315.
263 "The idea that Board determinations can be directly enforced against employers

cannot be upheld on grounds of statutory construction, legislative history, or labor policy."
Farmer 694. See also Mann 53-55.
264 LMRA § 10(e), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958).
265 Mann 53-54 nn.316 & 317. Nor does the word "order" in the exculpatory clause of
8(b) (4)(D) seem to include a 10(k) award.
200 Farmer 694-95; Comment, 61 CoLIu-r. L. Rlv. 1142, 1153 (1961).
267 93 CoNG. REc. 7487 (1947), 1 LEoisATns HISTORY 918-19. Numerous writers have
agreed. E.g., Mann 51-55; Farmer 693-97; Comment, 61 COra.M. L. Rlv. 1142, 1153-57
(1961).

268 See Lodge 68, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 81 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1949) (Moore Drydock
Co.).
209 Mann 55.
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ment on the rights of management and would seriously undermine collective bargaining. Such a requirement would go far beyond the negative guarantees against
unfair discrimination or a refusal to bargain in good faith in regard to work assignments and would encourage unions to ignore the normal collective bargaining
270
channels and to seek instead the assignments desired directly from the Board.

Although enforcement of Board awards would qualify managerial prerogatives, enforcement would be consistent with the interest in protecting
the public from inter-union conflict.
The only recourse open to the employee group, then, seems to be concerted activity. Yet, such action would be literally prohibited by section
8(b) (4) (D) since in enumerating the defenses to an 8(b) (4) (D) charge
Congress made no reference to employee activity in support of a Board
decision. Furthermore, section 303 provides a damage action for
employers for the same conduct proscribed by section 8(b) (4) (D), but
does not provide a defense based upon a 10(k) award.
Although union activity in support of a Board award is literally
proscribed by the statute, there is no failure of compliance on the
union's part. It would not seem to be an abuse of discretion for the
Board to refuse to proceed further than a 10(k) proceeding when the
charged party is willing to comply. A complaint is usually not issued
under section 8(b)(4)(D) unless a determination is not complied with,
since a charge is sufficient to invoke the 10(k) procedure. The Board
could not proceed under section 10(b) in the absence of a complaint
issued by the General Counsel, who may in his discretion refuse to issue
complaints where the employer is failing to abide by a voluntary settlement or a Board award." There is no bar, however, to a proceeding
under section 10(b) following noncompliance with a 10(k) determination.
That the General Counsel or the Board may refuse to proceed is a
devastating commentary on congressional thoroughness. It seems incongruous that the policy of settling jurisdictional disputes based upon
the protection of the public and employers from work stoppages can only
be enforced in some cases by permitting a strike which is literally prohibited by the act. In fact even this resolution is not satisfactory since
the union may be too weak to force compliance. Thus, although it seems
clear that no direct enforcement procedure against employers exists, even
indirect pressures may be insufficient.
It would seem anomalous for the Board to recognize a union's right to
certain work and then deny economic coercion to obtain such work.
270 Farmer 695.
271 Manhattan Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1952).
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Section 10(k) determinations thus would become little more than advisory opinions, seemingly contrary to the Supreme Court's assumptions
in CBS. Yet it is not clear that the Board will dismiss an 8(b)(4)(D)
charge when the employer refuses to comply. As mentioned earlier, the
dismissal of a charge under section 10(k) is based upon "compliance"
by the parties, and a 10(k) award is not expressly made a defense to an
8(b) (4)(D) unfair labor practice. Indeed, a 10(k) award is preceded
by a finding of reasonable cause of an 8(b) (4) (D) violation; therefore,
a 10(k) award does not necessarily mean that section 8(b) (4) (D) has
been violated. Congressional intent and statutory language would then
seem to require the Board to proceed with an unfair labor practice proceeding when the successful union in the 10(k) proceeding continues to
strike. Such a harsh approach could be modified by refusing to proceed
unless the employer demonstrates compliance" or by giving the Board
7
discretion based upon the grounds used in determining the dispute.1 1
Although most employers will probably comply with a Board determination, the lack of adequate enforcement machinery is a deficiency which
should be corrected.
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES IN THE COURTS
INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS

Whenever a regional representative has reasonable cause to believe
that conduct violating section 8 (b) (4) (D) has occurred and a complaint
should be issued, he may petition a federal district court for injunctive
relief under section 10(l). 174 In jurisdictional disputes the regional officer
is authorized to seek injunctive relief only when "such relief is appropriate"; his action is not mandatory as in other 10(l) injunction proceedings. The court's function is limited to the question of whether,
based upon the evidence, the petitioner has "reasonable cause to believe"
that the charges are true;2 75 there is no requirement that the court decide
whether a violation of the act has in fact been committedY2 6 The Board
need not "conclusively show the validity of the propositions of law underlying its charge; it is required to demonstrate merely that the propositions of law which it has applied to the charge are substantial and not
frivolous. 277
272 McGuinn 124-25.
273

Farmer 696.

274 LMRA § 10(i), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (Supp. V, 1964).
276
276
277

Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 242 F.2d 808, 810 (2d Cir. 1957).
Madden v. International Organization of Masters, 259 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1958).
Schauffler v. Local 667, UAW, 201 F. Supp. 637, 638 (E.). Pa. 1961).
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Although there is no statutory authorization for requiring initiation
of a 10(k) proceeding before seeking a 10(l) injunction, nonetheless
the district court in Lebus v. Local 60, Plumbers Union278 refused to
enjoin union conduct because no 10(k) proceeding had been initiated.
In that case the regional director had combined an 8(b) (4) (A) "hot
cargo" charge with a jurisdictional charge in requesting the injunction.
The court found no merit in the first charge and expressed doubt about
the second. The court deemed a 10(l) injunction, pending a determination of the unfair labor practice under section 10(c), "at best, premature. 270 Whether the court's approach will be followed in cases where
only a jurisdictional charge is filed is unclear. In any event, the unfair
labor practice is not determined under section 10(k). This determination
is only reached if the respondent union refuses to comply with an adverse award, long after a 10(l) injunction is needed.
Furthermore, a conflict of decisions has arisen. In McLeod v. Newspaper Deliverers Union2 0 the court rejected a union defense that the dispute should be resolved internally through the union grievance and arbitration procedures. In McLeod, the competing union, the Mailers, had
refused to submit the dispute to arbitration, and processing the dispute
through the Deliverers' administrative machinery alone would not resolve
the dispute. The court, however, stated that even if all the parties had
agreed to arbitration, "it would mean only that the Board would be precluded by section 10(k) from making a determination as to which
union is entitled to the disputed work."2 ' It would not preclude the
Board from instituting this injunction proceeding 282
The conflict between Lebus and McLeod is apparent. The McLeod
court would issue an injunction when it finds that the petitioner has reasonable cause to believe that the respondent union is engaged in conduct
violating 8(b) (4) (D) irrespective of whether the Board may quash notice
of the 10(k) hearing because there was an agreed method of settlement.
On the other hand, the court in Lebus attempted to tie sections 10(k) and
10(l) together, and, unlike the McLeod court, may have attempted to
interpret the "appropriate" clause of section 10(l).
Another problem facing the courts is that of defining the scope of
278 193 F. Supp. 392 (ED. La. 1961).
279
280
281
282

Id. at 394.
209 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Id. at 44o.

"It is well settled that a § 10(k) hearing and determination is not a prerequisite to
the institution of § 10(l) proceedings." Ibid.
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section 8(b) (4) (D). It was noted above that the Board has narrowly
defined jurisdictional disputes to exclude disputes between an employer
and one group of employees. The same problem has been presented to
the courts in 10(l) proceedings, and one court has denied an injunction
because of the Board's rationale. In Penello v. Local 59, Sheet Metal
Workers Ass' 8 3s the court decided that section 10(k) was an integral
part of the policy expressed in section 8(b) (4) (D) and that both must
be read together. Therefore, if there were no "dispute" which could be
determined under section 10(k), there could be no violation of section
8(b) (4) (D). Conversely, if conduct were within section 8(b) (4) (D),
a dispute "cognizable by the Board in a Section 10(k)
it would present
2 4
'
hearing. ) s

The Penello court then interpreted the sections as requiring two rival
and competing groups'of employees. Like the Board, the court emphasized the language in CBS that "the dispute" under section 10(k) "can
have no other meaning except a jurisdictional dispute under section 8 (b)
(4) (D) which is a dispute between two or more groups of employees over
which is entitled to do certain work for an employer.12 85 The court rea-

soned that section 8(b) (4) (D), as well as section 10(k), could not apply
to a situation in which there were not two competing groups of employees. Since there is no enforcement procedure against an employer,
a 10(k) determination in favor of the respondent union would not resolve the dispute but would merely take respondent's picketing out of
the act's proscriptions."' 8 It is not inevitable that the respondent would
be awarded the work, however, and the lack of enforcement procedures
against an employer may only be congressional oversight. The statute's
legislative history does not conclusively exclude from coverage a dispute
between an employer and a single union, and the statutory language
does literally include such disputes. Ironically, the Penello court, by
denying the injunction because there was no violation of section 8(b) (4)
(D) also takes the respondent's picketing out of the act's proscriptions.
The Penello holding has not gone unchallenged. The Eighth Circuit
has held that the jurisdictional dispute provisions are applicable when
288

284
285
286

195 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1961).
at 464.
Id. at 466, quoting 364 U.S. at 579.
'Ticketing in such a situation [where the picketing union is not a party to the 10(k)

Id.

proceeding] is not proscribed by § 8(b) (4) (D) because it does not involve a dispute between
rival groups of employees over particular work." Id. at 471.
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the dispute "might be said to be solely between an employer and a
Union. ' - 1 Indeed, the conduct held not to be a jurisdictional dispute
by the Board in Safeway was enjoined by a district court after the
decision in CBS2 8 8 The respondent union in Safeway had moved to
dissolve an injunction issued prior to CBS.2 8 9 The court rejected the

union's claim, a contention later accepted by the Board, that CBS defined "dispute" as a controversy between two competing employee
groups. The court correctly pointed out that the question before the
Supreme Court in CBS was not whether the controversy was covered by
section 8 (b) (4) (D), but rather concerned the functioning of the Board in
10(k) hearings. Jurisdictional disputes involving a neutral employer,
who probably will be more amenable to any Board award, may offer
greater likelihood of final settlement and industrial peace. It is not clear,
however, that all other jurisdictional disputes are excluded from section
10(k) and, therefore, from section 8(b) (4) (D).
SECTION 303290

Employers may bring suits in federal courts for damages caused by
union activity which violates section 8(b) (4) (D). By referring to 8(b)
(4) (D), section 303 (a) incorporates the standards necessary to a determination that section 8(b) (4) (D) has been violated. A 10(k) award is
not expressly made a defense to a 303 action, so the Board could conceivably permit what a court declared unlawful. Even if the award were
a defense, however, the incongruity remains because a 10(k) proceeding
is not a prerequisite to a damage action.""- Thus an employer, by bypassing Board procedures, insures that the defense can never be raised.
Moreover, parallel actions before the Board and a district court raise
the possibility of inconsistent results, though some inconsistency must be
expected whenever parallel actions are permitted.
To resolve this apparent inconsistency, courts could defer to the
administrative competence of the Board.29 2 Since the employer need
not initiate an 8(b) (4) (D) charge, however, there may be no proceeding to which to defer decision. Moreover, deferral would have no
287 Local 978, Carpenters v. Markwell, 305 F.2d 38, 47 (8th Cir. 1962).
288 Dooley v. Highway Truckdrivers, 192 F. Supp. 198 (D.Del. 1961).
289 Dooley v. Highway Truckdrivers, 182 F. Supp. 297 (D. Del. 1960).
290 LMRA § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 187
(Supp. V, 1964).
291

Ibid.

292

See Note, 61 YAL. LJ.745, 751-53 (1962).
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relevance unless a 10(k) award is to have some effect upon the outcome
of the damage suit. As a matter of policy, it may be wise for courts to
give substantial weight to a Board decision, but there is no statutory
language making this mandatory. Furthermore, as pointed out earlier,
a 10(k) award does not decide whether an unfair labor practice was
committed,"'3 and a union which is successful in a 10(k) proceeding
may have violated section 8(b) (4) (D). The only practical solution is to
limit section 303(a), as well as section 8(b) (4) (D), to section 10(k).
The Board has held that section 8 (b) (4) (D) is not "violated" until there
is noncompliance with a 10(k) award. Similarly, there may be no violation of section 303 until a 10(k) proceeding is held. Thus, if respondent
union is successful in a 10(k) proceeding, there would be no violation of
either section 303 (a) or section 8 (b) (4) (D). Here again, however, there
is no statutory reason why a court cannot proceed with a damage action
in the absence of a 10(k) determination.
An assumption implicit in the above discussion is that inconsistent
results are to be avoided. However, such inconsistencies as may exist do
not stem from different interpretations of the parallel provisions, but
only from the fact that section 10(k) is a necessary step in the protection afforded by section 8(b) (4) (D) but not in that afforded by section
303(a). As pointed out, it is not inevitable that a 10(k) award will be
considered a defense to an action under section 8(b) (4) (D). Such a
determination may be regarded as a mere advisory opinion which may
be rejected by the employer, or as no more than a procedural bar to
further Board action on behalf of a noncomplying employer2 9 4 It is
evident that Congress desired an independent tribunal to pass on the
legality of concerted activity in support of jurisdictional claims, and
was not primarily concerned with providing a symmetrical framework.
The Supreme Court has already answered part of this dilemma. In
InternationalLongshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp.,295 the Court
held section 10(k) to be an administrative limitation upon the Board
but not upon a court. 96 Although the case stands for the narrow prop293 In a complaint proceeding the standard is "preponderance of the evidence.' See International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 142 N.L.R.B. 257 (1963) (National Sugar Ref. Co.), where
the Board found that the trial examiner erred in a complaint proceeding after a 10(k)
award in failing to evaluate the evidence independently and by concluding that he was
bound by a prior 10(k) proceeding. The error was harmless, however, as the Board based
its findings on a de novo review of the record.
294 Farmer 690-91; McGuinn 124-25.
295 342 U.S. 237 (1952).
296 Id. at 243-45.
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osition that a cease and desist order is not a prerequisite to the recovery
of damages under section 303, it is evident that the Court felt that a
10(k) determination also was not necessary. The practical result of the
decision, then, is that conflicting decisions are possible.
Even though conduct may "violate" section 8(b) (4) (D), however,
there may be no 10(k) proceeding. The Board, for example, will quash
notice of a 10(k) hearing if the parties have voluntarily adjusted the
dispute or submitted evidence of agreed-upon methods of settlement.
There is no reason to assume that section 303 was not intended to compensate for damages suffered during the strike, even though no 10(k)
award is made.1w
In light of the Board's limited pre-CBS conception of its duty under
section 10(k), it is arguable that the CBS decision and its directive to
render affirmative awards will require a reconsideration of Juneau Spruce.
Although the Court in CBS held that "substantive symmetry" between
the sections was not necessary, it did not at that time have to decide the
effect of a 10(k) award upon section 303(a). The Court's view of "independence" should be relaxed so that there could be no liability in damages
before a 10(k) determination. Damages could lie, however, for actions
contrary to a 10(k) award prior to an unfair labor practice adjudication
under section 10(c). Thus, the union would be further induced to comply
with the award. Similarly, a section 303 action could be denied to an
employer who refuses to be bound by the 10(k) determination. An
opposite approach would not only dilute the effectiveness of the 10(k)
proceeding but would weaken private arbitration as well, because the
employer, despite an arbitrator's adverse award, could recover damages
for a strike caused by an assignment which violated traditional jurisdictional lines or area practice. Limiting the scope of section 303(a), on
the other hand, would continue to give the employer the protection of
section 8(b) (4) (D) and, at a later time, section 303 as well." 8
CONCLUSION

Certainly problems arise whenever decisions are based upon the existence and the balancing of a list of criteria. Not only must the criteria be
found, but they must be accorded values or weights. Accepting these
problems as inevitable, nonetheless a review of NLRB decisions suggests
that criteria have been shuffled and shifted to justify a preordained re297 Note, 50 GEO. LJ.121, 137 (1961).
298 See id. at 136-39 (1961) ; Farmer 690-93; McGuinn 126-27.
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sult.20 9 There can be little quarrel with most of the factors set forth in the
Jones opinion. Although the Board's decisions will not parallel those
of private arbiters such as the Joint Board, perfect symmetry, even
if possible to achieve, is probably unwise. The Board's traditional arbitration standards must be applied with a recognition of the Board's
statutory role as administrator of the entire act. Especially important in
light of the significance of the antidiscrimination principle of sections
8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) are the Board's efforts to look to the particular
workers affected and not to their unions. Although the Board's attempt
to avoid the thrust of the antidiscrimination sections is not entirely
satisfactory, the Board seems to be making the best of an extremely
difficult situation.
Furthermore, recent cases demonstrate that the Board is willing to
look beyond the employer's assignment. In two such cases it has overturned the employer's assignment in the absence of an inter-union agreement, solely on the basis of the Jones criteria. °° Both awards were based
upon the nature of the work, the particular productive process and the
skills required.
An area of serious concern is the effect of Board decisions upon private
methods of settlement. Surely, the premium given to employers' assignments has not encouraged resort to private arbitration, at least on the
part of employers and the employee groups assigned the disputed work.
The existence of alternative forums with different standards will inevitably induce a party to choose one forum over another. The Board, however, by its disregard of prior Joint Board awards has not improved
the situation.
Statutory conflicts in addition to those discussed in this article plague
the Board. For example, the relationship of section 8(b) (4) (D) to section 8(b) (4) (B) has been troublesome. 3 1 Although the Board's position
that the sections are mutually exclusive may be retained, a redefinition of
secondary boycott, at least in light of the particular characteristics of the
construction industry, is probably required.3 While this conflict of
standards, forums and statutes cannot be justified by referring to the
299 See O'Donoghue 321-22; Cohen, NLRB and Section 10(k): A Study of the Reluctant
Dragon, 14 LAB. L.J. 909, 917-18 (1963).
800 Kentucky Skilled Craft Guild, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 152 (1963) (General Elec. Co.); Local
499, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (1963) (Iowa Power & Light Co.).
301 See O'Donoghue 334-37.
802 See Ibid. See also Local 5, United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing Indus., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (1964) (Arthur Venneri Co.).
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"evils" of jurisdictional disputes, popular support and political considerations in 1947 were not conducive to thorough legislative examination. It
seems justifiable to point out, as has Professor Mann, that the legislation
has "suffered from too many friends and not enough critics." 08
803 Mann 59.

